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Some Possible Effects of World War II
on the Social Studies Curriculum
Murry R. Nelson
Pennsylvania State University
Abstract
Conventional wisdom about curriculum holds that change occurs slowly after exten-
sive design and planning that includes active participation of teachers. A survey of
the professional literature, curriculum guides, textbook advertisements, and news-
paper articles from the World War II era suggests that, under some conditions,
change can be imposed and occur rapidly . Textbooks on air power reached the mar-
ket quickly for new courses, offerings in German declined dramatically, and courses
in preflight, radio, and electricity appeared . In social studies, geography and selected
aspects of democratic heritage in United States history were emphasized at the ex-
pense of ancient history. Despite some calls for indoctrination of democracy as a
faith, educational commissions stressed global awareness, international cooperation,
and interdependence of nations as important goals for the social studies . Subsequent
events beyond the chronological scope of this paper resulted in some regression in
the decade after the war, but curricular changes during World War II foreshadowed
some contemporary curricular emphases in social studies.
This paper considers the response of social studies educators to the crisis
of World War II and the effect of the war on the social studies curriculum .
Many contentions offered in this paper should be taken cautiously . With
few systematic surveys of wartime curriculum and a more than forty-year
gap, one must rely on assertions of practice made in journal articles, cur-
riculum described in journal articles, curriculum guides or excerpts from
them, newspaper articles which often contain sweeping generalizations, and
advertisements for textbooks in the war years . It should also be noted that
great variety was prevalent across the country so contentions are made with
these caveats intact .
The war came quickly and it appears to have shocked educators into swift
action. Despite England's early entry (1939) into World War II, the schools
seem to have spent little time, other than in problems of democracy or cur-
rent events courses, on the study of the war and the ramifications thereof .
Judging by textbook advertisements and articles in social studies journals,
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the war in Europe was not given specific attention in the curriculum prior to
World War II .
During the spring and summer of 1942 initial changes were proposed in
school programs around the country. According to a New York Times
article :
The schools will become armed service preparatory schools . Courses
have been rewritten with the assistance of Army and Navy leaders . . .
The rise of democracy and the fight for freedom will be stressed in the
history classes . . . Perhaps the greatest emphasis will be placed on the
importance of air power . (Fine, 1942)
Fine's articles discussed changes in American schools . In Monument, CO
High School, for instance, students learned "how health, geography, his-
tory, physical training and other school subjects can tie in directly with the
war activities" (Fine, 1942) . Reports received from five systems in varying
sections of the United States said high school students would play a definite
role in the war effort. Examples from Santa Barbara, CA, East Orange, NJ,
and New York, were also offered .
During the coming year we can expect to see the schools become even
more closely allied to the national war program . However, the educa-
tors realize that this is but an emergency situation, and one that will be
replaced when peace is here again. (Fine, 1942)
The concept of air power that the New York City schools was to empha-
size was a new and unique aspect, and the topic swiftly entered the school
curriculum. Teachers College sponsored and developed a 16 volume Air
Age Education Series published by Macmillan . One volume that speaks
directly to our topic was Social Studies for the Air Age (Bartlett, 1942),
written by a social studies department head from Garden City, NY . The
book had nine chapters dealing with the history of flight and flight issues of
the present and future .
Other textbook companies also had air power texts or series . McGraw-
Hill had advertisements for its Wings for America text in 1943 issues of The
Social Studies while 1942 and 1943 issues carried advertisements for the Air
Age Education Series from Allyn and Bacon . Similarly the Journal of the
National Education Association carried advertisements for Allyn and
Bacon's series from 1942 to 1944, for Macmillan's series in 1943 and 1944,
and for Nystrom's maps for teaching air age geography . In addition, a full-
page ad for Air Age Education Research appeared in the October, 1944,
Journal of the National Education Association . The ad notes that, "our
periodical, `Air Age Education News,' will keep you informed . Please write
for a free copy."
A survey of 79 schools in the fall of 1942, published in 1943, confirmed
the swift rise of air age courses . Of the 94 new courses added to the cur-
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riculum since the war began, 77% were of a mathematical or technical nature
with preflight the most popular (33 courses), and electricity and radio a dis-
tant second with 12 courses (Wright, 1943). In addition, 39 courses had a
change of emphasis to the war, with 27 focusing on aviation or navigation
and 12 including emphasis on the meaning of democracy . Amidst all this, 15
courses had been dropped, predominantly foreign language, mostly Ger-
man. A slight rise in Spanish courses, however, illustrated the new interest
in Latin America in world affairs .
Most proposed curricular changes were at the high school or junior high
school level . Jersild (1942) believed that children's understanding of the
larger war issues was not vital until the end of elementary school or the be-
ginning of junior high school . Rather, the elementary school should provide
a psychological outlet for dealing with anger, fear, loyalty, and the value of
participation .
In December, 1942, Francis English, Superintendent of Schools in Ful-
ton, MO, offered some ideas on . altering a social studies program for war-
time. He recommended teaching democracy as a faith and buttressing that
faith by emphasizing democracy's strength and problems, not its shortcom-
ings (English, 1942, p . 67). English called for new units and materials, par-
ticularly on Latin America, Canada, and the Pacific . Recognizing that some
things would have to leave the curriculum, English asserted, "Sure it will
force us to use the surgeon's knife on some of the things we have in our
courses now but they will surely stand it" (p . 69). Finally, English said
schools must teach respect for leadership . "Democracy is the last best hope
of the world. The case can be proved for it and we do not have to apologize
for its shortcomings" (p . 71) .
This zealous nationalism was tempered by other educators . A conference
was held at Teachers College in December, 1942, titled The Present Edu-
cational Programs and the War Situation giving approaches and guides to
wartime teaching. Hunt stated that :
The main responsibility of social studies instruction is the same in peace
as in war : to develop citizens informed about the world in which they
live, possessed of as much understanding of that world as they can be
aided to achieve, and disposed to participate in its affairs as effectively
as they are able . (1943, p . 465)
Despite that constancy, Hunt went on to propose new elements of study
including the other Americas (South and Central), the Far East, Russia, the
Near East and Africa . He saw as crucial a push to make teaching materials
on these areas available as quickly as possible . Overall, geography war-
ranted much more attention .
The position of geography in the elementary school needs to be re-
considered, and clearly the policy of ignoring geography in high school
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needs to be revised, for the `new geography' - whether human geogra-
phy, or geopolitics -is not an elementary subject . (Hunt, 1943, p . 467)
Hunt issued a call for the study of the world at war including aims of the
war, world geography, wartime responsibilities of citizens, the study of
allies and enemies, and the place of youth in society . These suggestions were
for the short term, but some of Hunt's more permanent ideas are reflected
in today's concern for global and consumer education . These include teach-
ing the principles of peace, the history and possibilities of international or-
ganizations, consumer economics, and programs to promote human wel-
fare and security.
In the Teachers College conference closing session, Caswell summarized
the results . He made four general points : that education needed to provide
trained personnel for the Army, that education must keep working to win
the peace, that interest groups are still looking for a slice of the curriculum,
and that no solution has been offered on what to "eliminate from an already
crowded curriculum to make room for these new activities" (Caswell, 1943,
pp. 275-278) .
Caswell saw schools as responding in one of three ways to the war :
(1) school as usual, (2) no changes until Washington outlines it and orders it
into operation, (3) schools study the needs presented by the war situation
and seek to meet those needs in their programs (Caswell, 1943, p . 278) . This
latter view he believed was most common and reinforced Fine's view in the
New York Times article cited .
A long run view was suggested for curricular change initiated by the war .
Reflecting the influence of the Eight-Year Study, Caswell (1943) believed
that "mechanical restrictions on schools arising from college entrance re-
quirements, and typical plans of school organization are more easily modi-
fied now than at any previous period" (p . 279) .
A lengthy Guides for Action Emerging From the Conference included
curricular suggestions emphasizing that curriculum changes should not
represent mere additions to an already overcrowded program . Instead they
included more functional teaching of some material now in the curriculum
(e.g ., functional geography), an introduction of new units and courses (e.g .,
map making, preflight aeronautics, radio code), and a critical review of the
actual functioning of all courses in meeting the demands made upon citizens
of a democracy (Caswell, 1943, pp . 288-289) .
Some educators believed that the war and its study would have an up-
setting effect on pupils . Cronbach (1942) addressed that concern, contend-
ing that students had great confidence in the war effort, that they tended
toward the exaggerative in the destructive force of war, that they were con-
fused over economic problems such as savings, shortages, rationing, and
taxes, as well as being fearful of the loss of freedom . Cronbach offered so-
lutions for dealing with this dilemma of reconciling war with freedom and
saw the social studies teacher as the key to interpreting the war to all pupils .
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The group who can do most to build confidence and loyalty are the
social studies teachers . Discussion has a therapeutic value, especially
when such highly emotionalized topics as fear of death are brought out
into the open for calm consideration . (Cronbach, 1942, p . 303)
Cronbach believed that the social studies should develop student confi-
dence, thereby aiding the morale of an important generation .
The Wartime Policies Commission of the National Education Associa-
tion (NEA) and the American Association of School Administrators
(AASA) considered what Cronbach and others said and offered their views
on what schools should be teaching . Among the recommendations for the
elementary school were to provide opportunities for community service, ex-
pand and improve the teaching of cultural geography, and "emphasize
ideals of freedom and equality for which we are fighting and enrich artistic,
literary and musical experiences . . . to provide a release for wartime emo-
tion" (Wartime Policies Commission, 1943, p . 29) . In advocating curricular
change the commission noted that "the program for education in wartime is
not in some respects a program that we would favor in peace" (p . 7) . Re-
garding citizenship education, it was believed that, "we might need, for the
duration, to condense some ancient and medieval history in order to have
more time for the study of geography, of recent American and world his-
tory and of such current economic trends and problems as rationing, price
control, inflation and taxation" (p . 27) .
The commission proposed seven principles for teaching democratic citi-
gnship, some of which were more farsighted than the limited view of win-
ning the war . They focused on winning the war, having faith in the future,
and developing plans for world order, international cooperation, and
human freedom.
The National Council for the Social Studies (NCSS) also had a com-
mission on wartime policy which included Charles Beard, Erling Hunt,
A. C. Krey, Mary Kelty, I. James Quillen, Hilda Taba, Edgar Wesley, and
Howard Wilson (chairman) among others . The group stated that one of its
goals was, "energetic and total support for the conduct of far-flung war and
for the making of a just and lasting peace" (Commission on Wartime Pol-
icy, NCSS, 1943) .
The commission asserted that the current crisis demanded changes in the
social studies program . In studying the world at war, topics that ought to be
included were the American traditions and institutions that we were fighting
to preserve and extend; causes, aims, and issues of the war ; world geogra-
phy, including its relation to war strategy and to economic foundation of a
lasting peace ; the United Nations and techniques for cooperation; the na-
tions and people with which we are at war ; peace plans and objectives on a
world scale; and the problems of reconstruction .
Specific recommendations by the commission included emphasis in U .S .
history on the study of dramatic key episodes in our development, such as
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the Mayflower Compact, Bill of Rights, Monroe Doctrine, Emancipation
Proclamation, free public schools, and the social security act . It also in-
cluded more biographical study of men and women whose lives have per-
sonified the democratic tradition, and attention to the history and practice
of basic civil liberties . Many of these recommendations show a marked
Deweyan influence and reflect the writings of Rugg in his social studies cur-
riculum (Rugg, 1936) .
Both content and attitudes were to be represented with new areas of em-
phasis. Most importantly, a sense of globalness was strongly urged . This
was reflected in the emphasis areas that included : how nations have sought
peace; the history of China, India, Russia, and the British Commonwealth
of Nations; and U.S. history courses with special attention to heritage of
minority groups in the U .S .
The topics listed above reveal a foresight not evident in curriculum for at
least twenty years hence. It seems likely that the key ideas - globalness, non-
western histories and nonwestern cultures were largely ignored, or these
same recommendations would not be promulgated 40 years later . Most cer-
tainly, recommendations about minority study were ignored . Instead, it
took a 1945 race riot in Detroit to stimulate educators to initiate and de-
velop human relations curricula (Nelson, 1977) . The commission had largely
foreseen that problems might occur when hatred of Germans and Japanese
waned. Diffusion was sought under the section headed, Racial and National
Hatreds Must Be Attacked. Ways to do this included getting minority com-
munity members into school as resource people, analyzing race relations,
particularly those of the Nazis, studying ethics and moralities of great re-
ligions, and continued study of literature, language, music or art of those
with whom we are at war (Wartime Policies Commission of NCSS, p . 8) .
These sensitive human concerns would be supplemented with increased geo-
graphic study, including social geography, better map use, aviation geog-
raphy, and an emphasis on natural resources critical to modern industrial
life and military activity .
Many of these recommendations were adopted by schools in whole or
part. Vitcha (1943) described wartime social studies at one Cleveland junior
high school. Units there included Wartime Geography, The Airplane and
Global War, The Four Freedoms, Wartime Morale and Conservation, The
United Nations, Our Armed Forces, Wartime Economics, and Post-War
Problems: Foreign and Domestic .
More concrete development of the recommendations for the social
studies in wartime was needed . NCSS commissioned two volumes to do
this. One, Wartime Social Studies in the Secondary School by Hunt was
publicized, but apparently never produced. The other, Wartime Social
Studies in the Elementary School, by Chase appeared in September, 1943 .
The volume contained 51 pages of rationale, recommendations, and actual
school practices . Many of the comments parallel earlier statements by other
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groups or parties . Chase, for example, notes that "The tensions of war have
emphasized the necessity of increased attention to intercultural education"
(1943, p . 2) .
The value of the Chase publication was that it made useful suggestions
for teacher implementation and understanding . Under international coop-
eration and the proposed united nations organization, the following student
activities were suggested : (1) dictator research, (2) mock united nations
assembly, (3) compile pictures of modern weapons, (4) list war radio pro-
grams, (5) construct world maps of coal, oil, iron, copper, and other re-
serves, (6) make or find German or Japanese expansion maps, and (7) make
lists of United States peacetime imports and where they are from . Teacher
suggestions included: (1) read a weekly news magazine regularly, (2) learn
about new weapons, strategies and equipment of the war, (3) avoid an
"America is the only way" attitude, and (4) avoid developing the notion that
America should decide what the other countries should do after the war .
Sample units from around the country were presented, including content
on war production, war costs, war price control, war rationing, war conser-
vation and war services . Examples of such curricula were drawn from
guides and units in areas all across the country including Portland, OR, the
Rhode Island Department of Education, the Iowa Department of Public In-
struction, . the Cleveland, OH, Schools, the Department of Public Instruc-
tion in North Carolina, and the Oregon Department of Education .
The second section of the book is concerned with the world after the war
and with democratic living which must be planned and practiced carefully
since, "lip service alone will not build a better democracy" (Chase, 1943,
p. 18). A checklist of skills and techniques required for democratic action
included cooperation, discussion, abiding by will of the majority, choosing
leaders wisely, participating in school government, following a leader, serv-
ing as a leader, serving on committees, recognizing rights and property of
others, and thinking critically. Sections three and four were global in scope .
The task of intercultural understanding was seen as threefold : (1) "to pre-
serve the rich heritage of music, arts, crafts, folklore, tradition, literature
. . . which every immigrant group has brought with it to American shores,
(2) to interpret to minority groups the prevailing pattern of Anglo-Saxon
culture, and (3) to build for our nation a greater unity within itself by mak-
ing every group aware of its contribution to our way of life" (Chase, 1943,
p. 31) .
In section four, The World Wide Setting of Modern Life, Chase notes
that, "We have fallen short of the `one world' concept . Now in the ap-
proaching `air age' we cannot fail, for, if we do, disaster will eventually
catch up with us" (p . 41) . Curriculum changes were proposed, and were in
place in some schools . These included teaching the united nations (i .e., na-
tions united) rather than a general study of various peoples . "Reeder points
out how inadequate is a child's understanding of the wof1d when he studies
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it by taking up the location, surface features, soil and climate, products and
industries, and people and government of each country separately" (Chase,
1943, p . 43) .
In closing Chase advises that :
The world-wide point of view cannot be taught in a week, nor a year for
that matter . . . The teacher must be so convinced of the necessity of
having all pupils, by the time they reach the end of the sixth grade, have
some realization and understanding of the world-wide setting of mod-
ern life that she introduces at every opportunity either in present
course-of-study or other forms of organization or in special units of
work, the concepts, content and materials that will strengthen the
development of a true world citizenship . (Chase, 1943, p . 51)
The belief that curriculum change must go through years of design and
planning to become part of the program seems to be untrue . In a time of
crisis that inspires unity, curriculum can change at short notice. Faced with
a world crisis the schools and, more specifically, the social studies provided
materials and ideas for studying about World War II . The war effort, in
various forms, was viewed as an accepted part of the school's function . The
publishers provided materials to study the war on land, sea and air from
various points of view- politically, economically, and historically . The ad-
vertisements in The Social Studies and the Journal of the National Edu-
cation Association support this contention . Chase's (1943) volume details
many of the curriculum efforts on war study in schools across the United
States. The 1942 annual meeting of the National Council of the Social
Studies was entitled Social Education in Wartime and After and more than
half the sessions or panels were dedicated to this theme .
Much of the reaction to the war crisis was calm and judicious thought and
behavior. The planning of the NCSS and NEA-AASA policies commissions
was farsighted, realistic, and deliberate . Schools were asked at short notice
to aid in a substantive manner in the war effort . The men and women in the
field seemed to have responded admirably .
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Justice, Social Studies, and the
Subjectivity/Structure Problem
Walter C. Parker
University of Washington
Abstract
The claim that social studies education ought to promote justice is not uncommon in
social studies curriculum materials, plans, and commentary. With few exceptions,
however, justice is treated without attention to theory, history, or social context .
Lacking this foundation, its promotion has tended to be hollow and innocent . This
paper engages that problem at the point where justice, ontogeny, and ideology inter-
sect. Justice is analyzed from two theoretical traditions: cognitive developmentalism
and historical materialism. The viability of the developmental conception ofjustice
when located in historical-materialist theory is then assessed . Finally, the tension be-
tween the subjectivism of the former and the structural determination of the latter is
examined.
Simone de Beauvoir tells us in The Ethics ofAmbiguity, "It is in knowl-
edge of the genuine conditions of our life that we must draw our strength to
live and our reason for acting" (1948, p . 9) . At the heart of these conditions
is a tragic ambiguity: We experience ourselves as sovereign subjects, pure
internality asserted against the all-around, yet also as objects "crushed by
the dark weight of things" (1948, p . 7). Hegel denied this fundamental con-
tradiction, Marx ignored it, and Kierkegaard and Sartre asserted it, bring-
ing it forward as our ground . It is on this ground, on the irreducibility of
this particular ambiguity, that the present inquiry was undertaken .
The inquiry focuses on a central attribute of civic virtue-justice, and by
justice I will mean fairness . Opened for critical examination is the idea of
justice in social studies education . As this is a subject of some breadth, I will
have to narrow the present focus considerably and have chosen to concen-
trate on the point where justice, ontogeny, and ideology intersect. I will pro-
ceed by analyzing three conceptions of justice, one from cognitive de-
velopmental psychology and two from materialist, or socialist, theory, and
will locate the analysis in the question, How might a conception of justice
contribute to human betterment? My interest is a transformative justice
capable of moving society beyond the wasteland (Rozak, 1972) to forms of
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living together that are caring, lively, and fair -that are free, as Habermas
termed it, from "ideologically frozen relations of dependence" (1971,
p. 310) .
The first section is devoted entirely to cognitive developmentalism, par-
ticularly Kohlberg's (in press) theory of the development of a sense of
justice. I will highlight the foundation of Kohlberg's work in Piagetian
equilibrium theory and the similarities between Kohlberg's and Rawls'
(1958, 1971) conceptions of justice . This should provide an understanding
of what Kohlberg means by justice, as well as the procedure for reaching
just decisions that is implicit in his theory . The second section is an analysis
of the idea of justice from the vantage point of historical materialism . Here
I will not presuppose that justice is a meaningful category for either social
studies or , social transformation, but rather will consider that it may be an
illusory concern that does more harm than good . Third, I will consider the
viability of the Kohlberg/Rawls conception of justice from the vantage
point of historical-materialist theory . In the conclusion, I will examine the
paradox that emerges from the preceding sections-that of justice con-
sidered as a psychological state in developed individuals and, at the same
time, an expression of the way a society is organized .
Cognitive Developmentalism
Plato tells us that justice is latent in the soul . It follows that what is al-
ready there can be drawn out and need not (actually, cannot) be imposed
from without. Dewey echoed Plato, claiming "The aim of education is
growth or development, both intellectual and moral" (1916), and Piaget,
Kohlberg, and Gilligan have extended and qualified that tradition within
the discourse of cognitive developmental psychology. Kohlberg claims that
his crosscultural and longitudinal studies provide evidence "for the Socratic
view of a universal conception of justice proceeding through developmental
levels" (in press) . What is this conception of justice? We will understand it
first implicitly by examining Kohlberg's theory of cognitive moral develop-
ment; that is, we will derive it from Kohlberg's stage-wise description of the
natural evolution of a sense of justice . Then we will understand it explicitly
by examining the decision-making method employed at the highest level of
development in Kohlberg's scheme and by comparing it to the method of
moral reasoning employed in Rawls' original position .
Behaviorism, social learning theory, and cognitive-developmental
psychology each have explanations for the occurrence of just persons, but
those of the latter are cogent for three reasons . First, as Kohlberg notes
(Kohlberg & Mayer, 1972), cognitive developmentalism overcomes what
was heretofore a dichotomy between biological maturationist theory (e.g .,
Hall, 1901) and behaviorist theory (e.g., Skinner, 1971) by asserting a
dialectical, or interactive, model of human development . This model con-
siders human learning a function of increased epistemic integrity resulting
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from the interaction of person and environment . Second, cognitive de-
velopmental theorists, notably Piaget and Kohlberg, have displayed sen-
sitivity to the distinction between scientific inquiry and ethics as a field of
study. Piaget did not develop a theory of education or a curriculum design,
and Kohlberg is careful to distinguish between his theory of moral develop-
ment and his theory of moral education . Behaviorists, Skinner in particular,
have been more inclined to commit the naturalistic fallacy-inferring the
ought from the is (Kohlberg, 1971). Third, cognitive developmental psy-
chology rejects ethical relativism, or the view that value claims are culture-
bound and cannot be compared or reconciled by any rational means (Brandt,
1961) .
Piaget's ontogenetic theory of equilibrium laid the foundation for Kohl-
berg's later work. Piaget's well-known theory holds that one's way of know-
ing develops hierarchically through an invariant sequence of stages . No one
skips a stage, but development can be arrested at any stage . Each stage is a
qualitatively distinct, integrated thought system, and each, he reasoned, is
more complex, inclusive, and thus more powerful than preceding stages .
Upward stage movement occurs as one constructs a satisfactory response to
the experience of disequilibrium . The interaction of organism and environ-
ment engenders all manner of intellectual conflict from which the only satis-
fying escape is further cognitive development : the way out of the present
disequilibrium is the construction of a new way of knowing within which
the conflict dissolves. As one's way of making sense of the world thus
evolves, both knower and known develop . All is formative. The subject-
object duality continually shifts so that objects, whether toys, rocks,
parents, or friends, are known anew by a new knower-an evolving self
(Kegan, 1982) .
The evolution of knower/known incorporates both the physical and
social worlds, a point illustrated vividly in Siegel's (1977) study of children's
reactions to the assassination of Martin Luther King . Children ranging in
age from eight to sixteen years were asked, "When the killer is found, how
do you think he should be treated?" Older children thought the killer should
receive a fair trial and be punished according to the law, while younger chil-
dren thought the killer should receive specific, usually extralegal punish-
ment. For example, the killer should be "turned over to the Negroes and let
them take care of him," "Let Mrs . King kill him," and "Dr . King was killed
by him so the same thing should happen to him ." In response to questions
like, "Why do you think Dr . King was shot?" and "What made the person
do it?" the older children more often gave answers indicating abstract poli-
tical thinking (e.g ., "He was killed because he tried to do something for the
Negroes"), while the younger, concrete-operational thinkers more often
personalized the shooting (e.g ., "He hated King" or "Because a riot might
have went on in his neighborhood and wrecked his home, and he thought
Dr. King started it") . Specific punishments and personal motives are con-
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Crete representatives of the event ; the ideal of justice mediated through a
fair trial or political ideology is abstract .
From Logical to Ethical Judgment
Siegel's study adumbrates the relationship of cognitive developmental
stage to a developing sense of fairness . Kohlberg's imaginative theory of
moral reasoning is an extension and qualification of Piaget's dialectical,
stage-wise conception of intellectual development . As an individual's rea-
soning about the physical world evolves, Kohlberg argues, so does one's
capacity for reasoning about the world of people and relationships and, in
particular, fairness (Kohlberg, Levine, & Hewer, 1984a, 1984b) . Before we
can regularly consider others' perspectives in our reasoning about issues of
fairness, our mode of perception and judgment must have been developed
beyond egocentricity; we must be capable intellectually of accommodating
the other as another subject . In Piaget's terms, the transcendence of un-
abashed egocentrism requires the set of intellections called concrete opera-
tional thought central to which is reciprocity, or the ability to see two
dimensions of a problem simultaneously . So, the concrete stage makes pos-
sible an advance from justice-as-obedience to justice-as-equal exchange .
Further cognitive development, from concrete to formal operations, per-
mits yet another qualitative advance in our sense of justice from simple to
ideal reciprocity (Kohlberg, 1971) . This entails imagining yourself in
another's role and considering what you would want from that perspective
as represented in the colloquialisms "putting yourself in the other fellow's
shoes" and "seeing where someone else is coming from ." With the advent of
the intellectual capacity for ideal reciprocity, the Golden Rule is for the first
time comprehendible not as an admonition to treat others as they treat you
(simple reciprocity) but to treat them as you would want to be treated if you
were they .
Kohlberg's research indicates that at each cognitive stage individuals have
a distinct conception of right and wrong embedded in a distinct capacity for
role-taking, or taking the perspective of others . In brief, at stage 2 . I can
take the perspective of one other, but only in the limited sense of fair ex-
change. Here, two wrongs can indeed make a right, and "What's in it for
me?" is compelling logic . At stage 3, I can imagine (and consequently worry
about) what my friends think of me, and family ties and ethnic identifica-
tion can be consuming . At stage 4, I can take the perspective of an alto-
gether abstract, experientially nonexistent group such as my country, but
not until my reasoning has developed to the fifth and sixth stages am I
capable of universalizing my perspective, identifying with people every-
where, and acquiring a truly global perspective. Packed within my develop-
ing capacity for role-taking, my sense of justice expands and is qualified
with it . Fixated at stage 4 reasoning, I will not likely conceive two types of
law as did King (1963) : just and unjust. Instead, I might espouse a law-and-
order idea of justice : Rather than deriving my conception of law from the
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right, I will derive my conception of the right from the law-extant law . My
idea of justice will be entangled therefore in the status quo, be it just or un-
just. Consequently, an interest in moving the law forward toward justice,
let alone a commitment to envisioning quite different forms of society that
might advance the common good, could not likely arise because I am con-
fined to maintaining conventions without the additional transcendent ca-
pacity to interrogate their assumptions and contrast them with alternatives .
Fairness in the Kohlbergian view is thus an intellectual attainment, not an
inculcated attitude . That the school should engage heterogeneous groups of
students in democratic discussions of dilemmas they are facing is the central
proposition of Kohlberg's intervention theory. Rather than turning to that
subject, however, as many have (e.g ., Reimer, Paolitto, & Hersh, 1983 ;
Rosenzweig, 1982), I am concerned here to examine further the conception
of justice per se. My approach will be to compare the decision-making
method employed at the highest level of Kohlberg's system with the initial
fair choice situation in Rawls' theory of justice .
Justice as Reversibility
Rawls' A Theory of Justice (1971) develops his earlier paper titled, Justice
as Fairness (1958), and lays out an account of social justice based on a novel
approach to social contract theory . Common to contract theories is positing
an initial choice situation, a state of nature, as a means by which ideal social
arrangements, given human nature, might be determined . Rawls criticizes
Locke's and Rousseau's states as flawed initial fair-choice situations that
would not necessarily engender fairness in the arrangements agreed to
therein. Rawls then advances an initial situation, which he calls the original
position, that maximizes the likelihood of fair agreements . In his original
position, decisions are rendered behind a veil of ignorance that prevents
participants from knowing the roles they occupy, including their advantages
and disadvantages, once the veil is lifted . The veil, then, forces impartiality
into the discourse since the discussants do not know if they will be strong or
weak; captain or corporal ; able or disabled; Moonie, Baptist, or Shiite
Moslem. A decision made under such circumstances is more likely to be fair
because participants choose in such a manner that they can live with the
choice after the veil is lifted and they find themselves in a particular situa-
tion .
Kohlberg calls this justice as reversibility (1979) . He points out correctly
that while Kant's categorical imperative (act only as you would want every-
one to act in the same situation ; let your behavior be a model for all) ex-
emplifies universalizability, it is not, as Kant had hoped, sufficient for
generating substantive principles for evaluating or prescribing social ar-
rangements or in working out fair resolutions to specific interpersonal
dilemmas. Rawls' method is, as Kohlberg notes, more complete, exemplify-
ing not only universalizability but also the idea of reversibility . Reversibility
is the criterion of justice implied by the Golden Rule : You cannot figure out
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what is really the right thing to do until you consider being on the receiving
end of your actions ; that is, "it's right if it's still right when you put yourself
in the other's place" (Kohlberg, 1979, p . 258). Reversibility requires dia-
logue and impartiality as conditions for working out social justice; uni-
versalizability does not. Kohlberg spells out Rawls' meaning as ideal role-
taking or moral musical chairs . This means "going around the circle of
perspectives involved in a moral dilemma (a dilemma in which principles
conflict) to test one's claims of right or duty until only the equilibrated or re-
versible claims survive" (p. 262). Claims that are not reversible are dropped
from further consideration .
Rawls' cake cutting example, a favorite of Kohlberg, illustrates reversi-
bility at work . The just citizen put in the role of cake cutter would cut it
knowing that he or she would ask another person to distribute the pieces,
thus placing oneself on the receiving end of any indiscretions in the cutting .
Were the cake cutter to cut in a way that was self-benefiting, one would
have to do so knowing that the distribution would be blind . Knowing this, it
would make no sense to be unfair in the cutting . To the contrary, it would
make sense to be fair .
Returning to Piaget's equilibrium theory, we see that reversibility is the
formal quality of equilibrium in logic, again illustrating the complementar-
ity between reasoning about issues of fairness and cognitive stage develop-
ment. As Kohlberg reads Piaget, a stage of logic is an integrated set of logi-
cal operations or
. . . a group of reversible transformations of ideas, classes or numbers
which maintain certain relations invariant . Moral reasoning or justice
in Piaget's theory represents decisions which are not "distorted" or
changed as one shifts from one person's point of view or perspective to
another's . (Kohlberg, 1979, p . 264)
As the logic of equilibrium develops in stage-wise fashion, so does the
capacity for taking the perspective of others with less egocentric distortion .
An ethnocentric statement (like the one legions of social studies teachers
have heard, Why don't those Hindus get smart and eat their cattle?) displays
cultural egocentricity . It reveals no endeavor to engage the other as subject,
to take the perspective of the other . It reveals no attempt to see how the
smart thing to do might be defined from the vantage point of the hungry
Hindus. Nevertheless, cultural egocentricity makes complete sense from the
cognitive confines of a lower developmental stage .
Historical Materialism
It is important to expose this line of thinking, compelling as it is, to
substantive opposition . It is important especially to counter psychological
theories with sociostructural theories so as to inform the au courant fascina-
tion with psychoindividualistic explanations . These typically lack a critical
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sociological treatment of knowledge, which is to say they evidence little
awareness of the interaction of knowledge, history, human interests, and
material conditions (e.g., Horkheimer, 1972) . Consequently, I will critique
the Kohlberg/Rawls conception of justice from a materialist and histori-
cal-Marxist-perspective . Three criticisms will be sketched wherein two
Marxisms (moral and amoral) will become evident . Then, I will show that
the Kohlberg/Rawls conception remains viable and useful, although only
partial, in light of this critique .
At first glance, Marxism appears imbued with an abiding concern for
justice. Its central concern with exploitation and its consequence, aliena-
tion, certainly does not seem a morally neutral stance . Moreover, Marx's
view that the full and free development .of every individual and the absolute
elaboration of what lies within are the ruling principles of ideal socialism
seems obviously to be moral discourse (Marx, 1965, p . 592) . And, it appears
clear that Marxism's prognosis of an inevitable socialist transformation of
society was not merely put forward as objectively inevitable, but desirable .
Hampshire captures this moral concern undergirding Marxism :
For me socialism is not so much a theory as a set of moral injunctions,
which seem to me clearly right and rationally justifiable; first, that the
elimination of poverty ought to be the first priority of government after
defense ; secondly, that as great inequalities in wealth between different
social groups lead to inequalities in power and in freedom of action,
they are generally unjust and need to be redressed by governmental ac-
tion; thirdly, that democratically elected governments ought to ensure
that primary and basic human needs are given priority within the eco-
nomic system, even if this involves some loss in the aggregate of goods
and services which would otherwise be available . (1977, p . 359)
So a Marxist critique of Kohlberg would not, it would seem, oppose moral
theorizing per se since moral theorizing lies at the heart of Marx's work as
well. But, according to many in the school we might call classical or scien-
tific Marxism, such is not the case .
A materialist science of society, the most prominent of which is Marx's,
holds that objective material conditions account for the persistence and
transformation of social arrangements, or structures . In Capital, Marx is
explicit :
It is the ultimate aim of this work to lay bare the economic law of mo-
tion of modern society . . . . Here individuals are dealt with only in so
far as they are personifications of economic categories, embodiments
of particular class-relations and class-interests . My standpoint . . . can
less than any other make the individual responsible for relations whose
creature he socially remains, however much he may subjectively raise
himself above them . (1965, p . 10)
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This is no denigration of the value of individuals, as Marx is often mis-
understood to sponsor . Rather, it is analytic social theory. Marx asserted
matter-of-factly that individuals are constituted by the objective, class con-
ditions of their lives and, further, that to know those conditions-the un-
derlying social structures -is to know the people who live them and are their
embodiments . Subjectivity, then, can be deduced from material conditions .
Individuals, in this view, are epiphenomena : personifications of under-
girding relations of production, expressions of the economic base . Studying
epiphenomena as though they were the source, while ignoring the source
(material structures), is the very sort of illusory activity with which materi-
alist critics, including but certainly not limited to Marx, charge modern
social scientists (see Habermas, 1971 ; Wexler, 1983) .
Now here is the point. Moralities, too, are in this view epiphenomenal .
Conceptions of justice and, indeed, the whole of moral theorizing is neces-
sarily a chimera . We think otherwise, that morality is fundamental to per-
sonal and social transformation, only because ideology, taken to mean the
false beliefs arising in society that legitimize current arrangements as sensi-
ble and good (Mannheim, 1936), requires that we think otherwise . Marx has
been popularly misunderstood in the West as having spoken against the in-
dividual and against morality, when in actuality he wrote as a social scientist
endeavoring to describe the bases for both . In his view, impoverished
human relations, including today's common offenses to persons and prop-
erty, prejudice against women and minorities of color, despair, greed-all
of these exist as ontological expressions of a distorted social structure and
are not, then, moral problems to be overcome through individual moral de-
velopment. Similarly, the way out of Plato's cave is not to be derived by
scrutinizing ever more closely and cleverly, let alone striving to change, the
shadows on the cave wall . What is needed instead is careful scrutiny of how
ideology functions to make the shadows appear real and reasonable, lodg-
ing them in everyday life and common sense where they are accepted as
natural and escape critique . Marx accused fellow socialists of being pre-
occupied with justice and, in particular, with the just distribution of re-
sources when they ought instead to have been concerned with the causes of
these effects in underlying conditions of production. This materialist science
needs no moral theory since its purpose is to reveal and explain social struc-
ture and its effects, one of which is moral theorizing .
A second, related socialist criticism of moral theorizing is that, in addi-
tion to being epiphenomenal, it is dangerous . Moral hierarchies carry with
them the potential for the repression of those who fall short of the hier-
archy's moral ideal . Collier (1981), a scientific socialist, argues that Stalin-
ism is a case in point. Stalin was morally indignant at social conditions that
impeded the rise of a just society . The carnage justified on behalf of that
moral righteousness is well known . Other examples can be cited, from the
Crusades to Pol Pot's Kmer Rouge . The latter exterminated literally count-
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less numbers of so-called corrupt individuals who failed to exemplify in one
way or another the moral ideals of that revolution .
But one might feel compelled to argue, is it not immorality, rather than
morality, that accounts for these abominations? Collier thinks not, defend-
ing scientific socialism's amorality as a check against the passions of moral
madness .
Marx does not appeal to a particular privileged subset of human
motives, nor does he appeal to an unrealized ideal of human excellence :
he relies, for the motivating force of his ideas, on desires that existing
individuals already have . (1981, p . 132)
In this vein, it was in The German Ideology that Marx said :
Communism is not for us . . . an ideal to which reality [will] have to ad-
just itself [but] . . . the real movement which abolishes the present state
of things. The conditions of the movement result from the now existing
premise. (Quoted in Collier, 1981, p. 140)
Scientific socialism, then, takes morality to task not only for being
epiphenomenal but for opening the door to red terror, then white terror, to
the Klan and the Kmer Rouge, to impassioned school bus bombers around
the world .
Further developing this basic amoral although clearly humanitarian po-
sition, Tucker (1969) and Wood (1972-73) have argued that while it is true
that Marx roundly condemned capitalist structures for being inherently ex-
ploitive of labor, he did not condemn them on moral ground . He never
called them unjust or unfair and never criticized them for abrogating work-
ers' rights . This apparent paradox can be understood, according to Tucker
and Wood, by seeing that Marx did have a theory of justice, but one that
was radically historical. That is, justice is always to be understood as an
appendage of a particular social formation and, more specifically, an ex-
pression of its particular mode -of production . Justice under feudalism is
feudalist justice, justice under capitalism is capitalist justice, justice under
socialism is socialist justice, and so on . Garnering evidence for this view,
Wood points out that Marx thought slavery was unjust in capitalist societies
since it violated capitalism's own standards, but that the exploitation of
labor's surplus value was not unjust, since this appropriation functionally
defines capitalism. Using one social formation's moral principles to judge
another's is a mistake, for doing so fails to grasp the materialist underpin-
ning of justice and the historical, economic laws of motion that are the fo-
cus of attention in scientific socialism . Consequently, the Tucker and Wood
position directly counters the concept of universalizability by positing that
all conceptions of justice are structurally derived and by reminding us that
social structures are historical formations, not timeless entities .
What we have here is a compelling line of critique that would reject the
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theorizing of Kohlberg and Rawls not by contesting its particular concep-
tion of morality and justice, as so many have done (e.g ., Gibbs, 1979 ; Gilli-
gan, 1982 ; Noddings, 1984; Sullivan, 1977), but by drawing a line around
the whole concern and calling it false consciousness : much ado about
nothing . The activity of civic virtue, of knowing and doing the common
good, is a fine activity as far as it goes, but it fails to go very far . It fails to
extend beyond the economic base of which it is a consequence . To sum-
marize, justice is at best a trivial concern and at worst dangerous, ahistori-
cal ideology that obscures rather than discloses real injustice . It might tell us
whether Heinz should steal the drug that could save his wife, but it fails to
inform us that capitalism has stolen the common good and, with it, the
sense of vision needed to reinvent society.
A third criticism of the Kohlberg conception of justice, beyond the claims
that it is epiphenomenal and ahistorical, is the charge that it is individualis-
tic-that it promotes a disconnectedness among persons and a disinterested
autonomy that is woefully steeped in abstractions . An examination of the
original position appears to bear out much of this criticism . Behind the veil
of ignorance, individuals will presumably work out principles of justice and
specific agreements that are rational to individuals considering their own in-
terests, whatever they may be once the veil is lifted . Their principles and
agreements, then, may well protect individual rights and factional rights,
but they attenuate simple caring for one another and concern for common
interest . Consequently, civic virtue in the original position might not be
civic at all but a Byzantine marketplace where all parties look out for
themselves in a sort of gambler's game of distributive justice played with
blindfolds .
This is essentially Wolff's (1965) critique of pluralism . While its virtue is
tolerance, it functions ideologically to protect a few interests from one
another and, together, and from the dispossessed . Meanwhile, it is able to
ignore the dispossessed and problems of the common good . Pluralism is
thus "fatally blind to the evils which afflict the entire body politic, and as a
theory of society it obstructs consideration of precisely the sorts of
thoroughgoing social revisions which may be needed to remedy those evils"
(1965, p . 52) .
Historical -Materialist Theory
These criticisms are of some moment as they make us question the the-
oretical and historical viability of civic virtue, defined as knowing and doing
the common good, and with it justice, defined as fairness, as an ideal for
social studies education . That is, each criticism serves well the discussion of
justice in social studies education by advancing key historical and theoreti-
cal questions into a field that generally suffers from historical and
theoretical forgetfulness, or what Jacoby (1975) called social amnesia . What
remains to be seen is the capability of the Kohlbergian conception of justice
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to remain viable when located in historical-materialist theory, and that is
the subject of this section .
The first criticism asked, Isn't the study and development of a conception
of justice tertiary and, worse, distracting from the primary task of deter-
mining how material forces determine everyday life? This is the line of
criticism that equates morality with mystifying ideology . It should be noted
first that this is an argument against the development of a theory of justice
only if we assume that the theory developed is not itself a material force .
But this is not the case . As a form of practice, theory is indeed a material
force just as is ideology . And if ideology is a material force functioning con-
servatively to endorse the status quo by making it appear natural and moral,
then a theory of justice can function critically as a countervailing force that
interrogates ideology, disclosing just how it is implicated in current ar-
rangements (Reiman, 1981) .
Moreover, this criticism denies its own normative discourse . Reiman
(1981) has argued effectively in a discussion of Rawls' theory that while
scientific Marxists might insist that the advent of socialist society is inevi-
table and its desirability a tertiary and even dangerous concern, in fact the
purpose of developing Marxian theory was and is not merely to describe
history, but to affect it-to enable individuals to comprehend their mysti-
fication in the cave so that they might then turn toward the sun . In other
words, so that they might act on theory and thus affect the material world .
Individuals are not only determined personifications of the economic base ;
they are also agents who act . Of course, their actions are in good measure
determined structurally and their choices confined largely thereby to
predetermined options, but they do act and they do choose . To fail to see
this is to misconstrue causes as effects and to consider humans objects, as
did Althusser (1979) in his extreme proclamation that the base is determi-
nant in the last instance, when they are also subjects in their world : agents
mediating structure . Moreover, if individuals are to act on history, they
must know more than the material forces creating it and more than the
means of transformation . They must also be able to evaluate the common
good, for this enables them to choose whether to act for transformation and
which transformation to act for .
Countering this argument, Teitelman (1978) asks us to consider a man
with a clock that has stopped working. The knowledge of where he
ought to set the hands is useless until he knows what has caused the
clock to stop and fix it . Finding out the correct time before he has a
workable remedy is premature . (Reiman, 1981, pp . 309-310)
But, Reiman replies correctly, "You can't know if you have fixed the clock
if you don't know the correct time" (1981, p . 310). Here is the point both
Collier and Teitelman seem to have missed . Neither Stalin nor the Kmer
Rouge knew the correct time . It was not their sense of justice that engen-
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dered their cruelties. It was their poorly developed sense of justice. Lacking
a transformative axiology and in its place having only scientific laws of
history to guide action encourages elitism and the very sort of party dic-
tatorship to which many socialist movements have fallen . When esoteric
laws are reified and revered, then the many must submit to the few who
claim to divine them. Conversely, an axiology by which the common good
can be envisioned by everyone plays a central role in the democratic con-
struction of a better world and can serve as a vantage point by which social
movements and present or proposed social arrangements can be evaluated.
The second criticism asked, "Won't a so-called universal conception of
justice actually serve as just another piece of the ideological platform that
sustains the status quo? It will be remembered that Marx condemned
capitalism as inherently exploitive and alienating, but he did not base his
critique on a universal conception of justice . Rather, his conception of
human nature was materialist and historical . Consequently, the develop-
mental theory of civic virtue associated with Socrates, Dewey, Piaget, and
Kohlberg, with its specification of universalizability as a defining attribute
of a fully developed sense of justice, is necessarily both nonmaterialist and
ahistorical. It glosses over the historically specific social conditions in which
it occurs and by which it is determined; consequently, a temporary,
ideologically distorted and exploitive view of justice masquerades as eternal
truth .
The problem with this criticism, when applied to the Kohlberg/Rawls
conception of justice, is that it fails to grasp that universalizability as con-
ceived by Kohlberg and Rawls does have the capacity to transcend ideology .
Again relying on Reiman's analysis, we see that the decision-making con-
ditions in Rawls' original position constitute "a method for arguing around
ideology" (1981, p. 308). Participants in the initial, fair choice situation (1)
have the benefit of correct information about society, human nature and
technology, and (2) behind the veil of ignorance, they are free from the
perception-distorting ideology found in a particular society . This method is
not foolproof, of course, and exploitive arrangements could foreseeably be
generated ; that is, in applying the method, participants may be insuffi-
ciently rigorous and permit ideology to undermine their reasoning . But,
Reiman observes,
This amounts only to the recognition that the method is a procedure for
argument, not a substitute for argument . It tells us what we must argue
in order to argue that social relations are or are not exploitive and, cor-
relatively, what we must argue to show that theories of justice are
ideological covers for exploitive social relations . (1981, p . 308)
Consequently, the principles generated by the participants could be ahistor-
ical if the knowledge about social reality possessed by them in the original
position was ahistorical, but then it would not be correct knowledge, and
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correct knowledge is a necessary condition of the original position . How-
ever, recognizing that all knowledge admits of degrees of error (a qualifi-
cation no more paralyzing to this subject than to any), the arrangements
chosen in the original position will be just given the current development of
knowledge (Reiman, 1981) . This criticism, then, falls of its own weight . No
decision about just social arrangements, including the resolution of dilem-
mas, could possibly be historical if by historical we mean relative to present
material conditions and possibilities yet somehow transcendent of current
knowledge, which is itself a material condition . Rawls' original position,
therefore, with its assumption that participants "know the general facts
about human society" (1971, p . 138) and its attributes of universalizability
and reversibility, may very well produce principles that are historical .
The third criticism asks, Isn't the Kohlberg/Rawls conception of justice
individualistic? This criticism is addressed by the above discussion . Let me
add that the Kohlberg/Rawls conception, far from promoting radical dis-
interestedness, is relational . The sense of justice is inherently interactive . It
is developed not apart from but through and as a result of the committed in-
teraction of subjects in specific situations . Fair decisions are thus worked
out dialogically, not egocentrically, and with what Kant called an enlarged
mentality that cannot operate except intimately among persons intending to
understand a situation as the others in it do .
Justice as Paradox
I have undertaken this critique of the method of justice found at the high-
est level of Kohlberg's theory of moral development for two reasons . The
foremost aim was to bring forward the notion of justice in social studies
curriculum deliberation. But I wanted at the same time to expose justice as
problematic . Like all understandings, a conception of justice is constructed,
and its construction is a social event entangled in history and human inter-
ests. Second, I wanted to investigate the extent to which the particular con-
ception of justice advanced by Kohlberg and his associates is able to avoid
ready appropriation by whatever the present social organization happens to
be-that is, is able to avoid degeneration to mere ideology . The point is this :
A conception of justice that is to be constitutive of an ideal citizen type
should be thoroughly capable of discerning injustices not merely at the
surface of social life, in interpersonal and factional affairs, but in the
underlying modes of relating that generate social life . In short, a conception
of justice must be thoroughgoing and critical. This requires that it transcend
the spell cast by ideology so that injustices that are legitimized by ideology
might be revealed . Returning to de Beauvoir (1948, p . 91), a conception of
justice ought to promote efforts to surpass the given towards an open
future. Justice so conceived is necessary, although clearly not sufficient
(Noddings, 1984), to the broader search for the virtuous citizen and the
common good . Its particular contribution to that search is its capacity for
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recognizing patterns of domination, of unfairness, that may be lodged com-
fortably in everyday life and for proposing alternative ways of living to-
gether .
In my judgment, Kohlberg's theory of the development of a sense of
justice, as well as the particular conception of justice found at the highest
level of development in his scheme, remain viable, if partial, when subjected
to historical-materialist analysis . In the theory of development we have a
compelling explanation of the role of intelligence in deontological reason-
ing, and it is supported by an empirical base of considerable depth and
breadth. Further, Kohlberg's conception of justice as reversibility, which in
many respects parallels Rawls' method in the original position, describes a
democratic, or what Habermas would call a symmetrical, discussion that
not only helps resolve interpersonal dilemmas fairly, e.g ., Heinz's dilemma,
but also can contribute to the larger task of interrogating the fairness of
present and proposed social organization . However, what the historical-
materialist analysis makes quite clear is that both the theory of development
and the conception of justice are hollow when history and the crushing
weight of social structure are forgotten, and when a developed sense of jus-
tice is not applied to a critique of the status quo . Without these connections,
even a developed sense of justice is destined, under the weight of present
conditions, to be reserved for the relatively trivial dilemmas of our private
lives while the public sphere continues its demise .
More important, however, than determining the extent to which Kohl-
bergian theory is strengthened by socialist critique is the broader endeavor
of which this analysis is a part : to comprehend individuation, particularly
the development of fairness, in its social context . So, we must return now to
the fundamental contradiction on which the notion of justice becomes most
problematic: On the one hand, there is individual cognition which, given the
necessary conditions of development, appears to evolve toward the ad-
vanced intellections needed for principled thinking and the capacity for tak-
ing others' perspectives in dialogues about mutual problems . On the other
hand is social reality-the structures of relating within which the individual
individuates and, consequently, of which subjectivity is a distillation.
This subjectivity/structure tension cannot be eased without peril. The
classical Marxist argument considers justice epiphenomenal . While not un-
true, the argument is reductionist . It denies the tension and, consequently,
contributes little to an understanding of how humans might judge one social
formation against another and thereby move society toward the common
good . It ignores, if you will, the objective reality of subjectivity and fails to
account for the variation in individual's abilities to, returning to Reiman's
analogy, tell the correct time . Similarly, the subjectivist position, also not
untrue, is also reductionist . Today it enjoys free reign in a Zeitgeist that Ja-
coby labels a "cult of subjectivity" (1975, p . 119): a world of choices, will,
luck and merit, or their lack . This is just the sort of common sense needed
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and generated by market economies . Despite its popularity, the subjectivist
argument that human autonomy is free to evolve and express itself in infi-
nite ways, and that certain ways are central to social transformation, denies
the fact that most ways are determined by patterns of relating already es-
tablished among a people long before an individual comes along . The sub-
jectivist argument, then, denies the objective reality of a historically specific
social world in which subjectivity, including a sense of justice, is formed
and animated. With this denial, the argument degenerates to a vulgar ac-
quisitive individualism that heralds log cabin-to-White House mythology
while conveniently turning its attention from the cooling out function of
supposedly meritocratic institutions, like schools (see Goffman, 1952 ;
Parker, 1985). The product of social amnesia, the extreme subjectivist ar-
gument forgets to think back and through history . It is thus protected from
the dialectical tension but at the expense of missing altogether the politics of
experience .
The list of ills, from the present rash of serial murders to the dissolution
of communal life, the madness of commercialism, and the myriad domina-
tions of class, gender, and ethnicity, cannot be understood exclusively as
a crisis in individual moral development nor an expression of a flawed social
order. To reject the either/or approach is to reject the passivity of dichoto-
mous classifying for the activity of theorizing . The either/or approach can
do little more than advocate one side of the tension as an antidote for the
other. Just as thoughtlessly, it might press for a happy medium between the
two. This false dichotomy paralyzes both the person and the public . Neither
sphere can then contribute to the construction of forms of living together
that permit the full flowering of individuals and communities . But theoriz-
ing is capable of holding the subject/structure tension dialectically .
Theorizing draws, as Lasch (1984) notes, on the Aristotelian idea of
phronesis, or practical reason, which connects the moral character of the
citizen to the good of the polis by making the pursuit of the latter a charac-
ter-building activity for the former . So accustomed is the modern citizen to
separating these two that moral questions tend to be considered personal
matters and thus are driven out of the public realm . Meanwhile, public life
is devoted to instrumental questions-to techne . To seek virtue and with it
justice is to understand that the individual and the community must be
known simultaneously . While not an easy task, steeped in, ambiguity, it seems
the only reasonable alternative to the perilous forgetfulness of either pole .
"In an age that has forgotten history," Lasch reminds us, "theory has to
begin in remembrance" (1975, p . vii) .
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Abstract
A persistent issue in teaching social studies is whether teacher or students select prob-
lems to be studied. Alternative conceptions of the meaning ofproblem influence the
decision. Dewey rejected the position of positivism that problems simply emerge
from the data, but his followers sometimes -confused his positions on research in
social science and problems as subjects of study, in schoolrooms, particularly those
child-centered theorists who saw the only legitimate problems as those posed by
children. Earlier liberal critiques of positivist approaches are followed now by those
'of neoliberals and radicals . Neoliberals note failure to consider poetic, artistic, and
other types of systematic thinking. Radicals or critical theorists stress concern about
omission of problems for consideration that arise from political and social con-
ditions, often because these problems are unrecognized or rejected as threatening to
capitalistic interests . The various doctrinaire approaches have little appeal to most
social studies educators . This paper proposes that the issue is not whether students or
teachers select problems for study, but rather the distinction between competing
problematics and their allied social problems .
One perennially contested issue in the teaching of social problems in the
schools' centers on whether the . teacher should select the problem to be
studied or allow students to choose . The traditional question has been to
what extent social studies teachers ought to indoctrinate students . The prior
questions of what constitutes the meaning of problem in the context of the
social education classroom and what agenda competing notions of problem
and problem solving may set for social education curricula _and methods are
left unresolved. It is possible to discover the bearings alternative concep-
tions of problem may have on social education through the analysis of three
prevailing postures in social education theory : traditional (positivist), lib-
eral/neoliberal, and radical . The consequence of such an analysis should be
a more powerful understanding of the problem in social education today .
The Rejection of Positivism
.The legacy of logical positivism has been amply detailed by historians and
philosophers of science, and only a brief summary is in order here: Originat-
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ing in Vienna at the turn of the century, the logical positivists had come to
exercise a considerable influence by the thirties, when they began to disin-
tegrate as a group. Many of these Vienna Circle philosophers moved to
America and Great Britain . The major tenets of logical positivism and later
logical empiricism were: a rejection of metaphysics as meaningless ; a com-
mitment to using the scientific method ; a rejection of idealist or realist con-
ceptions of truth ; a concern for the logical character of language ; and a de-
sire to clear up the traditional problems of philosophy by desolving them .
While logical positivism itself did not affect social education thinking re-
garding problems and problem solving, the popular interpretations of logi-
cal positivism did. The positivist paradigm in social education holds that
there is a distinct separation between fact and value ; that the role of social
inquiry is like that of the natural sciences ; that social problems exist inde-
pendently of the observer ; and that the only knowledge worthwhile is em-
pirically verifiable .
The positivist paradigm is perhaps at its most dangerous when it is least
understood. Thus, it is common to find social educators talking of testing,
observations, and problems as if these were matters of an independent
science, free from the value position of the inquirers . The realm of values
teaching has felt this from such diverse programs as values clarification and
Kohlbergian moral education . The wedge that is driven between expert and
initiate tends to prolong and enlarge the assumptions that positivism fos-
ters. Well-crafted experiments, data collection, and even ethnographic field
research have felt the positivist explosion. The latest trend, naturalistic in-
quiry, is an effort to root positivistic inquiry in the domain of human valu-
ing by introducing checks for investigator values and bias, and proposing
that inquiry is still intersubjectively verifiable (Maxcy, Stanley, & Hickman,
1984) .
There have been two responses to positivism in its strong as well as the
variety of weaker versions : early 20th century liberal (and recent neoliberal)
and radical . These labels are overly simplistic and it is increasingly the case
that scholars are arguing they fail to reflect the true state of the art . Lasch
(1984) rejects traditional political labels such as radical and conservative for
failing to depict current debates, particularly with reference to survival, pre-
ferring instead categories such as the party of superego and the party of ego .
Historically, in the first half of the 20th century the debate over positivism
tended to be viewed from either a liberal position (of say, John Dewey) or
from a radical stance of someone like George Counts (1934), Harold Rugg
(1947) or Theodore Brameld (1971) . More recently, neoliberals have come
to criticize earlier liberals, while those who now espouse radicalism have a
wider spectrum of affiliations when their theories are examined relative to
specific curricular or research questions. The present essay will retain tra-
ditional nomenclature : liberal, neoliberal, and radical .
It therefore is not surprising that, in much of what passes as social edu-
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,cation theory dealing with the use of problems and problem solving in social
education classrooms,, there can be forced ambiguity . The contributions of
John Dewey to the current debate comprise one such area of misunder-
standing (Stanley & Maxcy, 1984) . Scholars have failed to distinguish what
Dewey said regarding problems and problem solving in the sciences from
what he suggested were the functions social problems were to fulfill in the
classroom . While Dewey was critical of the traditional positivist notion that
research problems simply emerged from the data, some social educators
take Dewey's own posture toward problem solving to be positivistic . In
part, Dewey merits criticism for giving this impression, at least in part be-
cause many of his writings on science were laudatory . (His own version of
pragmatism he called instrumentalism, which further confused the distinc-
tion between social and naturalistic science .) However, a careful reading of
Dewey's work reveals that he held to two fundamentally distinct views on
problem and problem solving (Dewey, 1933, 1938, 1944) . On the one hand
he wished social scientists to adopt the methods of the physical scientist in
their work; on the other, he proposed that teachers in the classroom serve as
-guides in social problem inquiry. Unfortunately, Dewey's devotion to sci-
entific method has been misread as a positivistic injunction that problems
be seen as the sole property of elite scientists working in laboratories (Maxcy
& Stanley, 1984) .
Beyond this misunderstanding of the dichotomy between problems in
laboratories and problems in schoolrooms, there was a very real misunder-
standing of Dewey's laboratory notion of problem and problem solving .
Perhaps more than any other liberal in the first half of the 20th century,
Dewey represents the classical desire to see problems as central to scientific
laboratory work . However in both classrooms and laboratories, Dewey be-
lieved that a prior condition for any problem was a problematic. He wrote :
The unsettled or indeterminate situation might have been called a prob-
lematic situation. This name would have been, however, proleptic and
anticipatory. The indeterminate situation becomes problematic in the
very process of being subjected to inquiry . The undeterminate situation
comes into existence from existential causes just as does, say, the
organic imbalance of hunger. There is nothing intellectual or cognitive
in the existence of such situations, although they are the necessary con-
dition of cognitive operations or inquiry . In themselves they are pre-
cognitive . . . (Dewey, 1938, pp. 107-108)
Dewey goes on to say that a problem is not a task to be performed which
a person puts upon himself, or one that is set for _him by others, like a so-
called arithmetical problem in school work . He argues: "A problem repre-
sents the partial transformation by inquiry of a problematic situation into a
determinate situation. It is a familiar and significant saying that a problem
well put is half-solved," (Dewey, 1938, p . 108). And once a problem is well
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stated, much has gone on that leads to the solution, he adds. From this we
cannot assume that Dewey collapsed problem solving in science with that of
problem solving in schoolrooms. Moreover, he distinguishes between a
problematic situation and a problem . The former is rough and ill-defined ;
the latter more narrow and specified .
The inquiry into social problems as a particular species of problematic,
Dewey found dominated by two attitudes . At one end of the spectrum were
persons occupied with administration or management of practical affairs,
who assume that problems are already determined and set ; all that was
needed was the best method to solve them . Habermas (1973) more recently
has talked of the enslavement of modern public administration to delivering
the goods, rarely if ever raising questions as to whether a particular policy is
worth operationalizing in the first place . The stress is laid on finding meth-
ods and techniques of analytic observation and comparison, so that the
problematic situation may be resolved into distinct problems . At the other
end of the spectrum were those who argue that the facts are out there and
need only to be observed, assembled, and arranged in order to produce
meaningful generalizations . Here the stress is not on the process or tech-
nique, but automatic and operationalized specification . The so-called data-
driven models for inquiry fit this latter category today and seem to prolifer-
ate where data are translated to mean statistics .
Dewey's solution to this dichotomy was to push for a better understand-
ing of the meaning of problem :
A genuine problem is one set by existential problematic situations . In
social inquiry, genuine problems are set only by actual social situations
which are themselves conflicting and confused . Social conflicts and
confusions exist in fact before problems for inquiry exist . The latter are
intellectualization in inquiry of these practical troubles and difficul-
ties. The intellectual determinations can be tested and warranted only
by doing something about the problematic existential situations out of
which they arise, so as to transform it in the direction of an ordered sit-
uation . The connection of social inquity, as to social data and as to con-
ceptual generalizations, with practice is intrinsic not external . Any
problem of scientific inquiry that does not grow out of actual (or'prac-
tical) social conditions is factitious ; it is arbitrarily set by the inquirer
instead of being objectively produced and controlled . . . . In fine prob-
lems with which inquiry into social subject-matter is concerned most, if
they satisfy the conditions of scientific method, (1) grow out of actual
social tensions, needs, `troubles' ; (2) have their subject-matter deter-
mined by the conditions that are material means of bringing about a
unified situation, and (3) be related to some hypothesis, which is a plan
and policy for existential resolution of the conflicting social situation .
(Dewey, 1938, pp. 498-499)
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Failure to treat problems in this manner would result in hardly more than
a form of intellectual busy work, Dewey reasoned . Whatever is observed
can only be understood in terms of projected results of action . Here Dewey
at once put to rest the argument, of the positivists that the deployment of
scientific method would end conflict aid doMusion, while simultaneously
alerting reformers to the necessity of seeing social problems as practical so-
cial situations and consequences . Dewey went to great lengths to tag the
social problem to a real social indeterminancy .
But all of this was to see some kind of link-up of scientific method with
social science problematic and problems . When Dewey talked of curricular
problems, he did not conceive of students as social scientists per se . He ar-
gued instead that teachers were to aid students in helping phrase social
problems on their own terms . Dewey wrote of the "necessity of situations
and problems that are vitally real to students" (1933, pp . 227-228). The
teacher was to be well educated in the knowledge domain to be taught, but
also sensitive to the attitudes and postures of students so as to monitor their
thinking processes . This facilitation was heavy-handed insofar as the
teacher had to steer children clear of dead-end methods and illogical think-
ing (Dewey, 1933, 273-279) .
It was clear to Dewey that the student was not necessarily the one to con-
ceive of an educative problem for study in the classroom. The teacher might
well select the problems. However, Dewey was concerned that such prob-
lems be connected with the student's present experience, be within their ca-
pacity, and arouse in the learner a search for new knowledge and ideas .
Where some contemporary theorists in social education go astray (e.g .,
Barth & Shermis, 1979) is in misreading Dewey's injunction that the prob-
lem arouse something in the learner . Dewey did not say that the problem
must be the. student's own to prompt such arousal . Students could very well
be moved to inquire by a teacher-selected problem .
The followers of Dewey derived differing educational directives from his
formulations. What problem meant in educational terms took on new
categorical meanings that have impacted on the present polarities in social
education theory . One group of Dewey disciples focused on the primacy of
incidental learning . Here learning was taken to be a means to an end, and
not the end itself. Students were to see the connection between the project
or task and what was studied in school . ,The purpose of problem solving,
given this view, was to give children the opportunity to try out in practical
projects whatever meanings emerged from the course of problem solving . A
second group of Dewey followers stressed that subject matter was essential
during certain periods of the child's development. Students were to master
these subject matters and modes of thinking in order to do future intellec-
tual work . The disciplinary studies were not clearly demarcated, but these
theorists believed that rigorous and progressive undertakings were essential
for the child (Childs, 1956) .
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It is important to see that while Dewey served as an intellectual father of
problem-solving strategies in social education, he must be understood as
talking on two levels . First, he is speaking to social scientists whom he
would have adopt the problem-solving approaches of the hard scientists .
Here his advice serves to free the inquirers from the dictates of authoritari-
anism. Second, when he is talking about problem solving in the elementary
and secondary school social education classroom, his advice is quite dif-
ferent. Children are not to be conceived of as miniscientists . Students are
not expected to discover worthwhile social problems on their own . The
teacher provides a vital role in helping children either by dictating problems
for study or by helping refine those the students may originate themselves .
Students were to learn the problem-solving skills through the orchestrated
activities provided by the teacher .
Thus, current debates regarding the use of problems and problem solving
in social education have been confused where social education theorists
have taken Dewey's recommendations for adult social scientists and applied
them to the child in the classroom . The picture has been further muddied by
followers of Dewey who seek to adopt a child-centered philosophy in which
the only legitimate problems are those the children pose themselves, versus
the subject-matter theorists who see the teacher inducting the children into
worthwhile problem areas and teaching them problem-solving strategies .
Neoliberal and Radical Critiques
Today, critics of the Deweyite problem-solving tradition fall into two
camps : neoliberal and radical . The neoliberals have raised a number of in-
teresting questions that strike to the heart of the scientific method and prob-
lem-solving assumptions within older style Deweyite liberalism . "What of
the attempts to assimilate all reflective thought to the problem-solving
mode?," they ask. Social education approaches that restrict reflective ac-
tivities to simple and gross sociological problems approaches seem to abort
other types of thinking that have at least as strong a claim to instructional
worthwhileness. The narrower focus on certain social problems tends to
rule out poetic, artistic and other kinds of systematic thinking . Certain dif-
ficulties emerge for Deweyite problem-solving strategies, when we discover
that children may work long and hard only to discover that they have been
laboring on a pseudoproblem. While genuine thinking goes on it is not al-
ways in response to a problem at all. Thus, we are left with the difficult task
of trying to sort out genuine from pseudoproblems and real inquiry from
daydreams, discomforts, and myth-making .
Scheffler (1968) suggests that the emphasis on initial problematic contexts
of the learner even from a methodological point of view seems to underplay
certain important educational values . Foremost among these is the creation
of new problems for the learner, the introduction of unsettled situations
where none existed before. The inquirer does not approach educational
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tasks within the limits of problems solely, but also with standards of relative
importancee of problems . Such standards are used as guides for the creation
of perceptions that are broader than-those of the learner, Scheffler argues
(1968, pp . 108-110). He goes on to point out .that there is a real difficulty
for Dewey's educational liberalism in our culture . We are increasingly dis-
tracted from and find it easier to avoid significant problems and to focus on
narrow. and personal problems instead. Thus, prmoble  solving alone will
not do it, for what we require is a broad and alert perception of significant
difficulties we face (Scheffler, 1968, p . 109) .
It may be argued, as the radical empiricist .Feyerabend (1978) does with
respect too normal science, that the actual development of institutions, ideas,
practices, etch, .-often does not start from a problem at -all . Rather, the in-
quiry begins with some " . . . irrelevant activity, such as playing, which, as a
side effect, leads to . developments which later on ,can be interpreted as, so-
lutions to unrealized problems . . . ." (Feyerabend, 1978, pp . 1 .75-176) . If, as
Feyerabend indicates, " . . : science is much more `sloppy' and `irrational'
that its methodological image . . . ," then social education is even more
sloppy and -irrational (p . 179).,Given Feyerabend's view, the emphasis on
problems and problem solving in the social education classroom is . over-
done . ,
Child's (1956) characterization of the prostitution of Dewey's true version
of problem solving omits a third group. of Dewey followers, loosely labeled
radicals, who in the 1930s and thereafter came to argue that scientific
methods ought ;to be :employed by children in the schools to deal with social
problems, with such problems -being . identified by society as problems .
Given this view, championed by Counts and others, social education prob-
lems neither arose from `child interest, nor from teacher imposition, but
from the dictates of society . Today, radical social education thinkers like
the critical theorists wish to argue that in fact schools and teachers often
overlook these real problems, 'with the result that the vital questions never
get asked . Given the radical . viewpoint, a revolution in thinking is required
wherein the positivist notions of science are overhauled along with the
liberal !pluralistic view of problems arising out of so-called democratic social
contexts .
Popkewitz (1984) sees current radical thought as drawing,upon two dif-
fering strands of the Western intellectual . tradition : (1) Marxist criticisms of
capitalism and, (2) liberal sociology of knowledge responses to Marxian
analysis . In part the critical theory viewpoint seeks to understand the as-
sumptions and bearings of rapid technological change, the role .of mass com-
munications, and the development of institutions as they impact on private
and personal lives. The critical sciences are interested in the political impli-
cations of societal arrangements, the demystification of patterns of knowl-
edge, and social conditions that prompt domination and restrict human
possibilities (Popkewitz, 1984, p . 17) .
301
Radical social philosophers of education conceive of the problematic not
only as questions regarding social inquiry but also of questions not asked,
as well as the relationship between these two modes . For a critical pedagogy
to emerge, it would be necessary to explore the ways in which traditional
positivist and liberal social education theorists like Dewey represented cer-
tain interests as they set the agenda of so-called social problems (Giroux,
1983, p. 48) . A rich distillate of this radical view is that it offers new ways to
see concrete social problems of quite different types within the schooling
context. Attention to matters of hegemony, for example, allow Apple
(1978) to provide a richer interpretation of curriculum . The political and
economic aspects of schooling become primary, while social questions of
abortion, equal access to schooling, etc ., are derivative (Apple, 1979) .
Finally, the radical critique does not stop at understanding . There is a
normative call for teacher reform as well . Giroux (1983) is aware that criti-
cal theory must inform both culture at large and the teacher in the class-
room. We cannot expect children in social education classrooms to perceive
social problems as functions of hegemony or capitalism, unless the teacher
comes to see them as such. The radicalization of the teaching profession
would yield the reform of the educational system, it is believed . The radical
teacher, who has a radical vision, has thus the responsibility of presenting
the proper social problems to the students in the class, those problems the
teacher sees as reflecting the deeper ills of the social system . Hence, we
come full circle with the call for indoctrination of social problems and the
use of rational scientific methods to solve them . In the end, the far right and
the far left come together at the schoolhouse door.
The Concept of the Problematic:
Conclusions and Recommendations
As we have noted, the most popular way to view the issue of social prob-
lems teaching is to polarize social problem origination between students and
teachers. Does the student arrive at his or her own social problem in order
to legitimate inquiry? Or, does the teacher set the social problem because
the child is immature, unacquainted with the literature, or too unskilled to
recognize the social problem as a problem? To avoid the charge of imposi-
tion or indoctrination, social educators have sought to allow students to
select their own social problems for study. However, the student-centered
approach systematically fails to take advantage of the funded knowledge
that the social scientist (and the teacher) may provide in social problem
characterizations . Both of these approaches have been criticized by radicals
because they avoid the introduction of deeper level problems of capitalism
and hegemony.
The current difficulty in social education theorizing is one of being placed
between the posture of giving lip service to a liberal Deweyite view of prob-
lem and problem solving, and adopting a radical posture that overthrows
Deweyite liberalism in favor of anarchy, romanticism and extreme sub-
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jectivism; or rejecting liberalism in favor of a neopositivism . Neither option
seems particularly attractive to the social educator . Moreover, the social
educator choosing some version of Deweyite liberalism runs the risk of
epistemological relativism ; choosing the more phenomenological approach
yields either an anarchistic or romantic vision, or the scientific approach of
the radicals leading to an academic authoritarianism as doctrinaire as posi-
tivism. There is .a way out of this impass, however .
First, we must recognize that what has passed as problem solving or the
problems approach in social education has rested on a naive notion of what
role problems play in inquiry versus learning . Following Dewey, it is essen-
tial to sort out problems as they operate in scientific laboratory work or as
used by social scientists in university settings, from problems utilized in
elementary and secondary school social education classrooms . Clearly, in
the latter situation, problems have a pedagogical importance, in the sense
that they ought to teach children something in the process of being worked
on in the classroom . One would almost be warranted in saying that prob-
lems in a social education classroom are artificial since they are extracted
from the society-at-large for the purpose of teaching children something
about that society. This pedagogical responsibility seems to have limitations
as well. For example, it is questionable whether working on problems in a
social education classroom ought to aid in character development as some
Deweyites argued, or whether they ought to lead to a commitment to social
action as others have reasoned. Raup, Axtelle, Benne, and Smith (1943, pp .
270-27 1) wrote, "No educational program can be adequate for the discipline
of the character for practical deliberation which does not provide gener-
ously for situations in which the learner is thus challenged to personal com-
mitment." This is not to say that children should not develop character
and/or commitment, but rather that it is bordering on indoctrination and
revolutionary incubation to call for them to come away from problem-
solving activities with readymade characters, willing to chart or take a
course of action. The list of reasons why this methodological position is
dangerous is lengthy, but the artificiality of problem selection and use in
classrooms should indicate the potential harm such v_ iews would have for
character development and social action .
It would be equally naive to allow social education problems to originate
in purely personal terms. Social education must stress the social nature of
problems . The followers of Dewey who wished to move away from child-
centered inquiry were correct in arguing that problems that were the child's
own could very well be meaningless to others in the classroom . Moreover,
what is to be accomplished by treating each child's whims, feelings, and
emotional ups and downs as serious academic issues in need of collective
solution? The teacher has the responsibility for keeping the class on larger,
more fundamental questions, and personal problems have little to add to
the larger curricular mission of the school or funded learning for the future .
In addition, it is unlikely that the child learns more about problem solving
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as he or she deals with personal problems than would be gathered from
more socially oriented problematic inquiry. The personalistic concern for
pupil problems as the only viable construct for social education classroom
learning fails to satisfy any of the criteria for serious academic inquiry and
seems to reveal the current deeper concern for narcissism .
All of this is not to say that pupils may not provide input into the casting
of the social problems to be investigated in the classroom . Rather, it points
to the difficulties attached to originating problems in pupil experiences
solely. Social education takes place within the social context of the school,
with social problems arising out of a social problematic, as Dewey called it .
It is the nature of this problematic context and precisely how problems are
set within it that is currently at stake in social education theorizing . Here the
radicals are correct in pointing out that the larger ideological context (the
problematic), is ignored as teachers go about setting forth problems to be
studied. However, what the radicals fail to acknowledge is the fact that
there are plural problematics and that choosing a particular problematic
tends to insulate inquiry and problem solving against other problematics .
The ideological view that capitalism is at fault should be set against the
problematic that declares we must look at feminist concerns as primary . To
some extent problematics may overlap, but they may be quite distinct as
well. For example, from an historic point of view the problems of female in-
equality antedate capitalism. Hence, a Marxist critique may be one of a
number of problematic characterizations that can warrant a problem-setting
and problem-solving curricular program .
Thus, a social education philosophy ought to treat the larger problematic
context if it is to do an adequate job of depicting problem treatment, teach-
ing and problem-solving strategies of the program . The development, ac-
quisition and criticism of problem meanings in social education shifts the
burden from one of justifying the locus of problem origination to the ra-
tional characterization of problems in the context in which they are set
forth .
Understanding the problematic entails an understanding of such matters
as: (1) the basic metaphysical and ontological commitments of participants
in a society ; (2) the kinds of relations that exist between basic entities in the
society; (3) a grasp of what counts as an explanation ; (4) knowing what
general laws govern the situation; and (5) knowing the methods and meth-
odology of inquiry . The problematic thus makes sense of the problems
studied as well as those not deemed worthy of study . It sets the limits around
the domain of problem inquiry and problem solving (Althusser & Balibar,
1970, p . 41) .
While the traditional positivist position sought to overlook the prob-
lematic, the liberal accepted the fundamental contextual conditions that
enabled it, and the radical seeks to overhaul those conditions . Both the
liberal and radical take the problematic seriously. If the difficulty is one of
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understanding, then the fundamental task facing problem selection and
problem solving is epistemological . , Therefore, we are confronted with the
matter of finding a perspective from which to view the problematic and con-
sequent problems that is not contaminated and is conceptually adequate,
sufficiently powerful to regulate problem-solving processes . The liberal and
neoliberal accept the notion of objective science and human rationality pro-
viding such a secure view ; this,they share with the positivist. The radical
focuses on self-understanding or cultural action as preferred discourses to
begin the search for a platform upon which to rest . Any neutral explication
of problem in social education carries in with' it some new problematic, and
the nest of assumptions, outlined above. Granted the impossibility of exiting .
this relativist position, what counts as an adequate social problem? The
answer to this question can only be that social problems are relative to -the
social problematic from which they are logically distilled . By,introducjng
this pluralistic and relativistic element to this discussion of theorizing about
social problems and problem solving, the best elements ,of the' liberal, neo-
liberal and radical positions can be preserved, while providing a more
powerful and meaningful conception of social problem for the classroom .
A new paradigmatic position may be constructed,, therefore, that, pos-
sesses the best of all the theoretical positions discussed in the foregoing :
Social problems may be seen as derived by teachers from -social problematic
contexts, with such problems being subject to student revision and reinter-
pretation, with the goal of seeking solutions rather than building character
or yielding action upon the part of students . Moreover, such problems are
subject to problem-solving methods that grow out of the problems and the
problematic, with the aim of promoting the development of thinking skills .
It is admitted that differing problematics will provide differing fundamental
answers as to: (1) the basic metaphysical and ontological commitments of
participants in a society ; (2) the kinds of relations that exist between basic
entities in the society; (3) what counts as an explanation ; (4) the general laws
governing the situation; and (5) the methods and methodology of inquiry .
However, this in turn is seen as fundamental to problematic inquiry and
knowledge .
Hence, the debate concerning the role of problems and problem solving
in social education has focused on the wrong players and issues . Rather
than being a matter of indoctrination of social problems by the teacher ver-
sus the free selection of social problems by students, the primary issue ought
to be seen as revolving around the distinction between competing alternative
problematics and- their allied social problems . Attention must be focused on
the-larger problematic frameworks with their competing assumptions . What
we have termed the problematic is increasingly being called into question by
radicals and neoliberals alike . If debate is to enhance our understanding of
the problem of problem in social education, it must attend to this new
ground .
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Abstract
An alternative is developed to Egan's (1983) proposal for the abandonment of the
social studies. This alternative is based in an examination ofthe distinctive character
of the social studies, which revealed that the social studies lacks integrity as a sep-
arate field in its own right. An examination of the reasons why the social studies
lacks this integrity provided insights for the development of a proposal for modifi-
cation. The lack of a limiting function inherent in statements of aims that have been
advanced as criteria for selecting content may have been the main source of disorder
in attempts to specify social studies content. Since social studies aims fail to provide
constraints, it is proposed that the social sciences be used to provide constraints on
these aims. To this end descriptions of examples of the scholarly parameters of se-
lected social sciences have been advanced, and the statements of aims have been re-
formulated to make them consistent with and attainable within these parameters .
The nature of the social studies has been a subject of debate throughout
most of this century, but this dialogue seems to have done little to clarify the
boundaries of .this field of study. In the name of citizenship education the
social studies has taken on functions that have been primarily the domain of
the home, the church, and the government . Within the field an uneasy truce
has existed between the demands of citizenship education and the demands
of scholarly content.
Egan aroused much controversy by claiming that the social studies "has
not worked, does not work, and cannot work" (1983, p. 190). He views the
educative value of the social science disciplines to be eroded'when they be-
come handmaidens to the socializing purposes reflected in the statements of
aims for the social studies (1983, pp . 198-203) . This is the main argument
underlying his proposal for abandonment of the social studies . While I
agree with his basic premise, I am not prepared to accept it as a basis for
abandonment. Criticism can also lead to modification . What . I attempt to
do in this paper is to develop an alternative to Egan's proposal for abandon-
ment.
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The purpose of this investigation was two-fold : (1) to determine whether
the works of selected social studies scholars reveal the distinctive character
of the social studies, and (2) to derive implications which provide the basis
for a proposal for modification of the social studies . The term distinctive
character is used here to refer to the subject matter that makes one field of
study different and distinctive from another (Silva, 1976, pp . 442-443) .
Throughout its history the social studies has been associated with the
social sciences . The social sciences, including history, geography, econom-
ics, sociology, political science, anthropology, and psychology, have been
its primary source of content . Mainly in the last two decades, speakers for
the social studies came to view its content as broader than that of the social
sciences. Apart from the disciplines from which it draws, the social studies
may not have a separate domain. To determine whether the social studies
should be recognized as a field of study in its own right, its relationship to
the social sciences and to the other disciplines from which it draws its con-
tent was examined . This investigation included an examination of the aims
for the social studies, and was limited to those aims that have been ad-
vanced as criteria for selecting content . Silva (1976, p . 443) claims that a
field of study can gain distinctiveness by developing criteria for borrowing
content and by using these criteria as a basis for converting the content of
other fields and disciplines into its own content, with criteria being state-
ments that set limits or boundaries on the content to be borrowed . Aims for
the social studies that have been advanced as criteria for selecting content
were examined to determine whether they serve as a basis for converting the
content of the social sciences and of other fields into the content of the
social studies. Aims for instruction were excluded from consideration be-
cause they were not pertinent to this investigation . They do not provide a
basis for determining the parameters of a field of study.
The review of the literature on social studies was not intended to be all-
inclusive or exhaustive . The review was limited to the works of major com-
mittees and commissions on the social studies and of selected scholars that
were pertinent to the question of the distinctive character of the social
studies as a field of study . Excluded from consideration were the works of a
number of notable social studies scholars that address instruction in the
social studies, a rationale for the social studies, or the history of the social
studies independent of a view of its distinctive character . Also excluded
were the works of social studies scholars that fall within a particular view of
the substance of the social studies but are not recognized as formulations of
that view .
The works of selected scholars in the social studies that are pertinent to
the question of the distinctive character of the social studies can be grouped
into two categories : (1) positions that view the social studies as a field
separate from the social sciences; and (2) positions that equate the social
studies with the social sciences . The debate regarding the question of the
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distinctive character of the social -studies revolves , around the relationship
between the -social studiesand the social; sciences: This two-camp division%is
a useful device for capturing the different orientations to treat this question .
From this examination of the integrity of the social studies - as a - field of
study emerged inferences which served as'a basis for a proposal for modifi-
cation. While the aims for the . social studies examined failed to serve as
criteria for selecting - content, this does not constitute an ,argument for their
abandonment. This proposal describes an approach to modifying these
statements of aims to bring , them in line with •the scholarly integrity of the
disciplines through which they are to be achieved . Since this study revealed
that these statements' of aims failed to' set111m itsion the content of the social
studies, those limits must be sought elsewhereAn the content of this pro-
posal, the disciplines through which the aims for . the social studies, are to be
achieved have been limited to the traditional. and primary source , of content
for the social studies, namely ; the social sciences .
The preoccupation of the social studies with statements of aims is syn-
onymous with its preoccupation with citizenship education ; These aims re-
flect divergent perceptions of approaches to achieving good citizenship . In
the name of citizenship education the social studies has promised more .than
it can deliver . Testimony to this view was provided by a survey of -civic
education in ten nations . This survey revealed that "nowhere has the system
proved capable of producing the ideal goal of a well-informed citizenry,
with democratic attitudes and values, supportive, of government policies
and interested in civic affairs" (Torney, Oppenheim ; & Farnen, 1975, p . 21) .
This problem points to the need to bring the -stater ents of aims for the
social studies in line with what is realistically attainabl"hrough - the content
of the social studies . To- this end a description of the , scholarly parameters, of
selected social sciences has been presented, and each 'statement of aim 'has
been modified to make it consistent with and realistically.- ttain b e within
the scholarly parameters - of a selected social science discipline . .-
Each statementt of aim was treated separately . The distinctive character of
a- particular social science discipline ' to which the substance of this aim
seemed pertinent was described . No attempt was made to determine if this
view captures -the theorizing in that discipline, the magnitude , of this ques-
tion necessarily placing it outside the scope of this study . This description of
the. distinctive character of a selected social science discipline was followed
by a modification ,of the statement of aim- by eliminating its socializing
dimension and reformulating its intellectual dimension to bring it in line
with the scholarly parameters of this discipline .
Social Studies as Separate from the Social Sciences
Several scholars and commissions have made a concerted effort to~ es-
tablish the social studies as a field separate from, but closely related to,, the
social sciences. A number of attempts have been made to -develop . criteria
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for selecting content from the social studies. Here we have an opportunity
to examine the capability of statements of aims for the social studies to
serve as criteria for selecting content .
The Committee on Social Studies of the Commission on the Reorganiza-
tion of Secondary Education, whose report is credited with giving official
sanction to the social studies (United States Bureau of Education, 1916),
claimed to differentiate the social studies from other studies on the basis of
social content (1916, p . 9) . The basis for selection was to be the pupil's "im-
mediate need of such mental and social nourishment and training as will
enable him to adjust himself to his present social environment and con-
ditions" (1916, p . 11) . Mental nourishment the social sciences claim to pro-
duce; social nourishment they disclaim . While selected social sciences pro-
vide insight into the process of social adjustment, they do not claim to bring
about improvement in this area . No direct correlation between the study of
the social sciences and the process of social adjustment has been estab-
lished. There is more to the process of social adjustment than knowledge of
the social sciences . If the relationship between knowledge of the social
sciences and the process of social adjustment is unclear, then this aim does
not provide a basis for determining the content to be borrowed from the
social sciences . Therefore, this aim does not meet the requirements of a
criterion that sets limits for converting the content of the social sciences into
the content of the social studies .
Engle (1960) proposed that decision-making should afford a structure for
the social studies (p . 301). He identified selectivity as one of the features
that distinguishes the social studies from the social sciences, the basis for
selection being the process of decision-making in which the citizen engages
(p. 301) . His description of this process as dealing with "public and private
matters of social concern" (p. 301) is too general to provide boundaries .
Having failed to limit the decision-making process, the relationship between
this process and the content of the social sciences cannot be determined .
This statement of aim is so vague that it does not provide a basis for deter-
mining which of the social sciences is relevant to the social studies, much
less the content within them which is relevant . Furthermore, Engle's argu-
ment that the process of decision-making involves more than knowledge of
the social sciences (1960, p . 301) contributes to the ambiguity of the rela-
tionship between the statement of aim and the content of the social sciences .
This aim is not capable of setting limits on the content to be borrowed from
the social sciences, and, therefore, it cannot serve as a criterion for selecting
content .
A committee of the National Council for the Social Studies (1962) recom-
mended that the goal of developing "desirable socio-civic and personal
behavior" (1962, p . 10) be used as a criterion for determining the content
from the social sciences to be included in the social studies . The committee
did not address the problem of agreement on the traits that characterize
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desirable socio-civic and personal behavior in a pluralistic society nor the
relationship between such behavior and knowledge of the social sciences .
Their failure to set limits on the process of developing desirable socio-civic
and personal behavior makes it impossible to determine the relationship be-
tween this process and the content of the social sciences . On the basis of this
process we cannot determine what content from the social sciences is to be
included and excluded . The vagueness of this statement of aim precludes its
serving as a criterion for selecting content . Further, the committee's argu-
ment that the development of desirable socio-civic and personal behavior
"grows out of the values, ideals, beliefs, and attitudes which people hold"
(p. 316) suggests that this process involves more than knowledge of the
social sciences, and the argument contributes further to the ambiguity of its
relationship to the social sciences .
Johnson (1969) identified improvement in value judgments as the chief
aim of the social studies (1969, p . 10) . Revision of the social studies was to
be achieved by using this aim "to draw upon and draw together" data from
the social sciences into the "synthesis" of knowledge which constitutes the
social studies (1969, p . 11). Johnson did not address the question of why the
aim of improving value judgments falls within the domain of the social
studies. Unless value judgments are specified and made amenable to vali-
dation, the relationship between value judgments and knowledge of -any
discipline cannot be determined . The social sciences look at value judgments
from a descriptive point of view and therefore do not constitute a basis for
the justification of value judgments . Further, improvement in value
judgments requires something more than knowledge of any discipline . If
justification of value judgments is the function knowledge serves in relation
to improving value judgments, and if this function does not fall within the
domain of the social sciences, then it can be argued that the aim of improv-
ing value judgments is incompatible with the content of the social sciences .
An aim that is incompatible with the domain of content from which it is to
draw cannot serve as a basis for setting limits on the content to be borrowed
from that domain. The vagueness of this statement of aim combines with its
incompatibility with the content of the social sciences to prevent it from
serving as a criterion for selecting the content from the social sciences that is
to constitute the social studies .
Massialas and Cox's (1966) effort to differentiate the social studies from
the social sciences did not involve an attempt to specify criteria for selecting
content. They argue that reflective inquiry constitutes a beginning descrip-
tion of "the emerging field of . social studies" (1966, p . 64). The social
sciences are to provide the facts, the evidence, the hypotheses, and the gen-
eralizations for use in inquiry in the social studies (1966, p . 65) . Their claim
that the social sciences provide limitations for inquiry in the social studies
(1966, p . 65) is cancelled by their failure to specify criteria for selecting the
content of the social sciences that is to serve as the substance of inquiry .
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Without the specification of criteria for selecting content, there is no basis
of differentiating the social studies from the social sciences .
These attempts to establish the social studies as a field of study that bor-
rows its scholarly content exclusively from the social sciences, but which at
the same time is different and distinct from the social sciences, are judged as
unsuccessful . A clear recognition that more was being asked of the social
sciences than they had to offer precipitated the development of more recent
proposals to make the social studies a broader field than the social sciences .
Engle (1971) and the National Council for the Social Studies (1971, 1979)
were major speakers for this view . While each admitted that the content of
the social sciences was neither necessary nor sufficient for achieving the
aims for the social studies, each maintained that part of the content of the
social studies was to be borrowed from the social sciences . This is the view
of the social studies that is dominant in the social studies literature in the
1970s and 1980s .
Engle (1971) departed from his previous position that the content of the
social studies was to be drawn exclusively from the social sciences . He
argued that the social studies is a broader field than the social sciences in
that it attempts "to fuse scientific knowledge with ethical, philosophical,
religious, and social considerations which arise in the process of decision-
making as practiced by the citizen" (1971, p . 282) . Within this framework he
probed the parameters of the social studies. As in 1960 he used the process
of decision-making in which the citizen engages as a basis for selecting con-
tent. In his quest for the content that has a contribution to make to the
grounding of beliefs that underlie the decision-making process, he found it
necessary to include content from all of the social sciences, literature, the
so-called serious arts, religion, philosophy, ethics, and the experiences of
youth outside of school (1971, p . 288) .
Here again we see problems associated with attempts to use decision mak-
ing in which the citizen engages as a basis for selecting content . Engle's
description of this process as dealing with "social goals and the means of
their attainment" (1971, p. 286) is so broad and vague that it is incapable of
providing limits for determining social studies content to be included or ex-
cluded. His claim that the information that is relevant to the decision-
making process must be decided by the citizen (1971, p . 284) further com-
promises the limiting function of the decision-making process by making it
subjective . Finally, his view of the democratic ideology as a given in the
social studies enterprise (1971, p . 285) requires the use of the content of the
social sciences and the humanities in a manner that is not compatible with
the scholarly orientations of these disciplines . They claim neither to advo-
cate nor oppose a particular political ideology .
While Engle's 1971 position constitutes an advance beyond his 1960 posi-
tion by accommodating the evaluational dimension as well as the factual
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dimension of the decision-making process, problems with the use of this
process as a basis for selecting content hampered his attempt to formulate
parameters for the social studies .
According to the National Council for the Social Studies, (1971, 1979) the
content of the social studies was to be drawn from "the social sciences, the
humanities, the natural sciences, the communications media, and the per-
ceptions of students . . ." (1971, p. 857; 1979, p.'263). The dual purposes
of functioning "rationally and humanely" (1971, p . 857; 1979, p. 263) were
to be used as the criteria for selecting content . Functioning rationally is
basic to the pursuit of knowledge in any discipline or field of study, and
would exclude no body of scholarly content from the social studies . Func-
tioning humanely is addressed by the humanities and the social sciences, but
it is understanding or explanation of humaneness and not improved
humane conduct that these disciplines claim to produce . No direct correla-
tion between knowledge and functioning humanely has been established .
The authors' claim that knowledge is to be used in conjunction with "think-
ing, valuing, and social participation" (1971, p . 857 ; 1979, p. 263) indicates
that they do not view knowledge as a sufficient basis for functioning ra-
tionally and humanely. If functioning rationally excludes no body of
scholarly content for the social studies and if the relationship between
knowledge and humane functioning is not clear, the dual purposes of func-
tioning rationally and humanely do not serve as criteria which provide a
basis for setting limits on the content to be included in the social studies .
The boundaries of the social studies remain unclear .
Excluded from consideration were the works of such prominent social
studies scholars as Hunt and Metcalf (1955) and Oliver and Shaver (1966)
that address aims for instruction as opposed to aims as criteria for con-
verting the content of the social sciences and other fields into the content of
the social studies .
Hunt and Metcalf claimed that "the foremost aim of instruction in the
social studies , is to help students examine reflectively issues in closed areas of
American culture" (1955, p . 223). They looked at content in the context of
the teaching learning process rather than as the substance that gives the
social studies its distinctive character . They describe content as "the data of
acts of reflective thought" (1955, p . 214), and while this content is likely to
"cut across traditional subject-matter boundaries" (1955, p . 226), it could
also be taught within the standard subjects that constitute the social studies .
Oliver and Shaver (1966) developed a jurisprudential framework for
teaching public issues in the high school. They claimed that the central aim
of the jurisprudential approach to teaching the social studies is "the clari-
fication of evaluative and legal issues" (1966, p . 115) . They argue that "the
essence of jurisprudential teaching is the nature of the discourse the teacher
chooses to have with his students" (1966, p . 239) and that this type of teach-
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ing can be used "within the context of the scope and sequence of practically
any social studies program (1966, p . 239) . Therefore, this position too fails
to address the distinctive character of the social studies .
Social Studies as Social Sciences
There is a considerable body of literature that does not attempt to treat
the social studies as a field of study in its own right . A number of scholars
equate the social studies with the social sciences .
The Commission on the Social Studies (Beard, 1932) used the terms social
studies and social science interchangeably, but later, in their Conclusions
and Recommendations (American Historical Association, 1934) the com-
mission made no reference to the social studies as such . This part of the
report instead addressed social science and instruction in social science . The
Commissioners describe both the social studies and the social sciences as
dealing with human affairs (Beard, 1932, pp . 13-18) . They maintained that
the tendency of the social studies to cut across the boundaries of the social
science disciplines was not to be interpreted to mean that a new "social
science had been created, a synthesis transcending the disciplines them-
selves" (Beard, 1932, pp . 20-21) . Rather, they equated the content of the
social studies with that of the social sciences .
Wesley (1942) admitted to being heavily influenced by the reports of this
Commission on the Social Studies . Like that body, he equated the content
of the social studies with that of the social sciences . This was evident in his
claim that the two "do not differ in kind ; they differ only in level of diffi-
culty" (1942, p . 21) . He identified the subject matter of both to be human
relationships (1942, p . 6). He described the social studies as "those portions
or aspects of the social sciences that have been selected and adapted for use
in the schools or in other instructional situations" (1942, p. 25). The dif-
ference between the two is not substantive in character .
In the 1960s, as a part of a general curriculum reform movement, the
primacy of the social sciences was reasserted . Keller (1964) went so far as to
call for the elimination of the term social studies altogether . Having failed
to identify substantive differences between the social studies and the social
sciences, he thought it appropriate to replace the term social studies with
history and the social sciences (1964, p . 41) . Berelson (1962) suggested that
reform ought to be in the direction of emphasizing the best available knowl-
edge from the social sciences as a means to the end of producing responsible
citizenship (1962, p . 6). Given that he regarded the pursuit of knowledge of
the social sciences for its own sake to provide a fundamental intellectual
preparation which is the best preparation for citizenship, he clearly equated
the substance of the social studies with that of the social sciences . Bernstein
(1965, p . 79) added further support to the trend to equate the social studies
with the social sciences by advocating the delineation of the "structural per-
spectives" of the various social sciences and the organization of these per-
3 14
spectives into an "integrated social studies curriculum" for the secondary
school . He argued that each of the social sciences has "a significant and
unique perspective to bring to bear on an examination of society" (1965,
p. 30) .
Citizenship education, when it was addressed, was seen as a by-product
of knowledge of the social sciences. The assumed association between
citizenship education and knowledge of the social sciences was not subjected
to systematic examination .
Fenton's (1967) work on the new social studies and that of Morrissett and
Stevens (1971) on social sciences in the schools fell within the position that
equates the social studies with the social sciences . Instead of formulating a
view of this position, they addressed the question of a rationale for offering
the social sciences in the social studies program (Fenton, 1967, p . 6; Mor-
rissett & Stevens, 1971, p . 4) .
Barth and Shermis (1970) and Barr, Barth, and Shermis (1977) identified
three competing traditions within the social studies which describe different
modes of selecting content . These traditions are social studies as citizenship
transmission, as social science, and as reflective inquiry (Barth & Shermis,
1970, p. 744; Barr, Barth, & Shermis, 1977, p . 59) .
In the tradition of the social studies as citizenship transmission, content
was described in a number of ways . First, the content "either is based on
tradition or is selected and organized by an authority . . ." (Barth & Sher-
mis, 1970, p. 746). The authors did not identify the content based on tradi-
tion. In the more recently created branches of the social sciences they relied
on the consensus of authorities . In this case they recommended topics that
reflect the conceptual structure of the social sciences (Barth & Shermis,
1970, p. 745). Later, content was described as the knowledge, assumptions,
and beliefs that characterize different conceptions of citizenship that
teachers wish students to share (Barr, Barth, & Shermis, 1977, pp . 59-61) .
In this case content was to be subjectively determined by the teacher . Finally,
content was limited to American history . It was to provide the knowledge
and appreciation of our heritage that is an indispensable ingredient in
preparing good citizens (Barr, Barth, & Shermis, 1978, pp . 49-50) . In the
context of this tradition, content to facilitate the preparation of good
citizenship was either subjectively determined by the teacher on the basis of
a conception of good citizenship or it was drawn from history or the more
recently created branches of the social sciences . In the case where the con-
tent of citizenship transmission was not subjectively determined, this tradi-
tion reflects the view of scholars who regarded the content of the social
studies to be drawn from the social sciences . It also reflects their attempts to
use statements of aims relating to citizenship education as criteria for select-
ing the content that is to constitute the social studies.
In the context of the tradition of social studies as social science, emphasis
was placed either on knowledge of the products of social science research or
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on the mode of inquiry of a particular social science (Barth & Shermis,
1970, p. 748; Barr, Barth, & Shermis, 1977, p . 63) . The authors admitted
that emphasis on knowledge for its own sake makes the relationship be-
tween the social sciences and citizenship education ambiguous . This tra-
dition reflects the works of the speakers for the social studies who equate
the social studies with the social sciences .
Reflective inquiry is the tradition in which social studies is described as
citizenship preparation, with citizenship defined as a process of making
decisions in a socio-political context (Barth & Shermis, 1970, p . 750; Barr,
Barth, & Shermis, 1977, p . 64). Content was identified as the "data of in-
quiry" (Barth & Shermis, 1970, p . 750). Only those problems "identified by
students as their problems" (Barr, Barth, & Shermis, 1977, p . 66) warrant
consideration. The subjective nature of the selection process was evident
from the authors' claim that "content is based upon whatever students con-
sider to be in their best self-interest" (Barth & Shermis, 1970, p . 750) and
that it was to be decided on the basis of the student's "perception of relevant
facts and values" (Barth & Shermis, 1970, p . 750). If the content of this
position were to emerge as a part of the teaching-learning process, and if the
selection process was subjective in character, then this position did not pro-
vide a basis for determining the content that is to constitute the field called
social studies . Works of scholars that fall within this tradition are more
properly classified as falling within the area of instruction .
As was true in the case of views of the social studies addressed in this
paper, this examination of the traditions within the social studies failed to
reveal that the social studies can claim recognition as a field of study in its
own right .
Conclusions
Social studies scholars are divided on the question of whether the social
studies has a distinctive character . They either view the social studies as a
field separate from the social sciences or equate the social studies with the
social sciences . Scholars who hold the position that the social studies is a
field separate from the social sciences viewed the content of the social stud-
ies to be drawn from social sciences and other fields, but failed to specify
criteria that constrain the selection of content for social studies . Their de-
scriptions of the social studies did not reveal its distinctive character .
Statements of aims in social studies for citizenship education posed prob-
lems as criteria for selecting content. These aims tended to be stated in such
broad, general and vague terms that their specifications did not provide a
basis for determining the social studies content to be included or excluded .
No direct correlation was established between these aims and the scholarly
knowledge through which they were to be achieved . It was evident that the
achievement of these aims involved more than knowledge of the social
sciences and, in some cases, other fields . The failure of scholars in the social
31 6
studies to provide a basis for determining the relationship between these
statements of aims and the knowledge through which they were to be
achieved further compromised their capacity to set limits on the content to
be borrowed. Thus, these statements of aims failed to serve as criteria for
selecting content, and did not provide a basis for establishing the social
studies as a field separate from the social sciences .
A failure to determine the relationship between the aims of social studies
as citizenship education and the knowledge through which aims are to be
achieved was also evident in the positions that equate the social studies with
the social sciences . Citizenship education, when it was addressed, was
viewed as a by-product of knowledge of the social sciences, with an associa-
tion between citizenship education and knowledge of the social sciences as-
sumed. This assumed association was not subjected to systematic examina-
tion. The relationship between aims of social studies and scholarly content
continues to be an unresolved problem .
A Proposal for Modification
Aims of the social studies tend to be stated so broadly that they fail to
provide a focus or direction for the scholarly content of the social studies .
Their broadness reflects a failure to differentiate between the educative
function of school and that of other social institutions . Egan (1983) cap-
tured the problem of the lack of a limiting function in these statements of
aims when he suggested that "even the most modest statements of aims . . .
promise the world, or worlds" (1983, p . 195). Broad aims have been a
source of disorder in the social studies, prompting Egan and some other
scholars to call for the elimination of the social studies . Attractive as this
argument may be from a scholarly vantage point, it is not realistic . The pro-
ponents for the social studies are unlikely to give up their right to make de-
mands on social content in the name of citizenship education .
To bring some order to the social studies, it is proposed that we modify its
statements of aims to bring them in line with the scholarly orientations of
disciplines through which they are to be achieved . In this proposal for
modification, the disciplines through which the aims for the social studies
are to be achieved have been limited to history and the social sciences .
Throughout its history the social studies has been associated with history
and the social sciences, and they have been its traditional and primary
source of content . However, this represents only one way of looking at the
scholarly content of the social studies . Alternative proposals could be de-
veloped to incorporate other disciplines . Scholarship limits the content of a
school subject, and these proposed limits at least have the merit of reflecting
the scholarly tradition of the social studies .
The distinctive character of history and the social sciences, serves as a
basis for constraining the aims for the social studies . This requires that the
aims for the social studies be converted into aims for each of the separate
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disciplines that constitute the content of the social studies . Once the schol-
arly integrity of each social science discipline has been determined, program
developers will have the information needed to modify these statements of
aims .
It is not the function of history and the social science disciplines to pre-
pare a child to fit into his role as a citizen in a democratic society and to
share the beliefs and values of that society . Through the scholarly orienta-
tions of the social sciences, the role of a citizen in a democratic society can
be described, explained, and criticized . The scholarly function of these dis-
ciplines requires a degree of objectivity and detachment that is at variance
with attempts to socialize the child to the beliefs and values of a democratic
citizen. Through this approach to modification, the socializing aspects of
the statements of aims for the social studies that are at variance with the
scholarly orientations of the social science disciplines will be eliminated and
their intellectual aspects will be reformulated. The revised statements of
aims will then be capable of providing a focus for the substance of selected
social sciences .
To illustrate this approach to modification, each statement of aim has
been treated separately . In each case the proposal for modification gives a
brief description of the distinctive character of a particular discipline to
which the substance of this aim seems pertinent . Next, an example of how
content related to the statement of aim under consideration is to be handled
in the context of this discipline is presented . Aspects of this aim that are
consistent with the scholarly orientation of the discipline under considera-
tion have been retained while those that are inconsistent have been elimi-
nated. The statement of aim is revised to bring it in line with the scholarly
parameters of this discipline . The fact that only one modification was ad-
vanced for each aim is not to be interpreted to mean that this is the only
modification that this approach permits, but it is one that is consistent with
and realistically attainable within the scholarly parameters of the discipline
through which it is to be pursued . A number of modifications that are
equally appropriate may be formulated .
In this study no attempt was made to determine the extent to which each
description of the distinctive character of a social science discipline captures
the theorizing in that discipline . However, on-going study of this question is
critical to the integrity of this approach to modification .
The student's immediate need for social adjustment (United States
Bureau of Education, 1916, p . 11). The question of social adjustment lends
itself to being addressed from a sociological point of view . According to
Durkheim, the subject matter of sociology is social facts which he described
as "ways of acting, thinking, and feeling, external to the individual, and en-
dowed with a power of coercion, by reason of which they control him"
(Simpson, 1963, p . 25) . The realm of the social refers to "either the political
3 1 8
society as a whole or some one of the partial groups it includes, such as
religious denominations, political, literary, and occupational associations,
etc." (1963, p. 25) .
Consistent with this orientation, sociology addresses social norms as the
basis of social control . What constitutes social adjustment can be described
as whether a person's behavior conforms to acceptable norms for that be-
havior in a given society . Sociology does not claim to be of help in the pro-
cess of improving social adjustment, but it does provide insight into what
constitutes social adjustment in a given society . Given what can and what
cannot be accomplished within the scholarly parameters of Durkheim's view
of sociology, the statement of aim advanced in the report of the Committee
on Social Studies (United States Bureau of Education, 1916) can be modi-
fied to read : to describe a basis for determining what constitutes social ad-
justment in a given society .
The process of decision-making in which the citizen engages (Engle, 1960,
1971). If some limits are put on the process of decision making by the citi-
zen, and if this process is given an intellectual focus, then it can be con-
verted into statements of aim that are attainable through the social sciences .
Since this statement of aim has been advanced twice by Engle (1960, p . 301 ;
1971, p. 282) as a basis for selecting the content of the social studies, we
have taken the liberty of providing two examples of its modification : first,
in the context of political science and, second, in the context of economics .
Easton (1965) uses systems theory as a framework for the analysis of
political life. Political life is viewed as a system of interrelated activities . Ac-
cording to Easton, the boundaries of a political system are determined by
the "interactions through which values are authoritatively allocated for a
society . . . " (1965, p . 21). Through the study of political activity within the
framework of this orientation to political science, the student can develop
an understanding of how political decision-making is initiated by demands
fed into a political system; how support is marshalled for such demands ;
how in the course of the conversion process demands are dropped, modi-
fied, or transformed into binding decisions ; and how feedback which in-
fluences subsequent demands and support is provided by these decisions .
Consistent with this orientation to political science, Engle's statement of
aim can be modified to read: to describe and explain the political decision-
making process in which the citizen engages .
If the realm of decision-making is economic, then it can be examined
from the point of view of economic theory . A description of the subject
matter of economics, if it is to capture the distinctive character of that dis-
cipline, should emanate from the basic propositions that characterize the
vying schools of thought within economics . An examination of the similari-
ties and differences between and among the basic propositions that charac-
terize the Classical, Neo-classical, and Keynesian schools of thought re-
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vealed one fundamental point of agreement (MacIsaac, 1980), Each school
of thought addresses the interaction of the forces of supply and demand,
but each addresses it differently . It can therefore be argued that the inter-
action of the forces of supply and demand constitutes a core argument
which captures the subject matter of economic theorizing . Propositions and
questions that stem from this core argument could constitute appropriate
content for the school economics program .
Keynes' (1936) general theory emphasizes the impact of demand on sup-
ply and the role of the government intervention in influencing the inter-
action of these two forces . Selected aspects of Keynes' theorizing, such as
the effect of demand on employment, the impact of expectations on in-
vestment, and the factors that determine propensity to consume, provide
content for probing the question of the interaction of the forces of supply
and demand. While reservations may be expressed about the difficulty of
some aspects of Keynes' theorizing, it needs to be noted that there are also
some aspects of his work that are readily understandable in their original
form or in a simplified form . Such a study could provide considerable in-
sight into the economic decision-making process. In the context of this
orientation to economics, Engle's statement of aim could be modified to
read: to examine the impact of government intervention on the economic
decision-making process in which the citizen engages .
The goal of developing desirable socio-civic and personal behavior (Na-
tional Council for the Social Studies, 1962, p . 10) . Social scientists do not
claim that their disciplines will necessarily produce either kind of behavior .
However, the question of what constitutes desirable socio-civic behavior
lends itself to being addressed from the vantage point of political science .
The same cannot be said for questions pertaining to personal behavior . The
term personal behavior, as it is used here, is so vague that it does not pro-
vide a focus for the substance of any particular social science discipline.
Within the framework of Easton's (1965) view of the scholarly
parameters of political science, desirable socio-civic behavior can be ex-
amined for its impact on support for the political system . Support is treated
as a basic part of the activities which in interaction constitute Easton's
political system . If the political system is to function effectively, the politi-
cal authorities must be able to make decisions, or to get them accepted as
binding, and to make them operational without the extensive use of coer-
cion (1965, p . 153). The persistence of the system is, therefore, dependent
on support for the authorities, the rules and structure for decision-making,
and the political community. An understanding of what constitutes direct
and diffuse support for a political system on the part of its members could
serve as a basis for determining what constitutes appropriate socio-civic
behavior within a given political system . Consistent with the scholarly
orientation of political science, the goal of developing desirable socio-civic
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behavior could be modified to read : to develop a basis for determining what
constitutes appropriate socio-civic behavior in a given political system .
Improvement in value judgments (Johnson, 1969, p . 10) . Contrary to
Johnson's claim, this aim for the social studies does not lend itself to be-
ing achieved through the content of the social sciences (1969, p . 11) or, for
that matter, any other discipline . No discipline claims to provide knowledge
that necessarily leads to an improvement in value judgments . There are,
however, aspects of value judgments that lend themselves to being ad-
dressed in a disciplinary perspective . The process of justifying value judg-
ments has a normative orientation and, therefore, ,belongs to the domain of
philosophy. There are other dimensions of questions pertaining to value
judgments that lend themselves to being treated from the vantage point of
the social sciences . In the context of Durkheim's view of the scholarly pa-
rameters of sociology, values can be addressed from a descriptive point of
view. In this perspective values function as a belief system imposed upon us
from without . The norms which act as mechanisms of social control in a
given society reflect values that are basic to that society . The individual can
be helped to gain insight into the impact of values on personal behavior by
examining the relationship between the basic values of his society and
norms of behavior which serve as social conventions to which he is expected
to conform in that society . Within the scholarly framework of sociology the
aim of improving value judgments can be modified to read : to examine the
relationship between the basic values of a given society and the norms which
act as mechanisms of social control in that society .
Functioning rationally and humanely (National Council for the Social
Studies, 1971, 1979) . Functioning rationally is synonymous with the basic
intellectual activities which are to be encouraged through the study of every
discipline. What constitutes rational functioning varies somewhat from dis-
cipline to discipline. Within the parameters of this proposal for modifica-
tion the treatment of any topic within the scholarly framework of the par-
ticular discipline through which it can be addressed would achieve this aim
of the social studies. From this it follows that each of our modifications in
the statements of aims for the social studies meets this requirement .
Functioning humanely is an activity no discipline claims to produce .
However, insight into man's worst failures and some of his highest attain-
ments in this area can be gained through the study of history, which pro-
vides ample documentation of man's inhumanity to man . While man's in-
humanity to man is a value-laden issue, the task of the historian is not to
make value judgments, but to describe the value judgments historical
figures made in the past and to examine how these value judgments in-
fluenced their actions .
Let us take, by way of example, the grievances that contributed to the
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overthrow of the Old Regime in France in 1789 . Class antagonisms were
fueled by the economic and social inequalities of the Old Regime . The
misery among city dwellers of the lower classes resulting from an acute
shortage of grain, sharp rises in food prices, and widespread unemployment
helped to explain why they supported the revolt in 1789 . The peasants had
grown restive under the burden of feudal and manorial obligations in the
forms of fees, dues, and payments in kind to the landlords, tithes to the
clergy, and taxes to the king . The upper class in the Third Estate had made
considerable economic gains but resented the remaining restrictions im-
posed upon them by the other two estates . The expression of grievances was
fueled by the ideas and ideals of the intellectuals who were highly critical of
the existing social and political order (Breunig, 1977, pp . 1-7) . Clearly,
man's inhumanity to man is reflected in the inequalities of the Old Regime .
Since debate regarding what constitutes the scholarly parameters of his-
tory often revolves around either the Idealist or Positivist point of view,
such an event could be examined in the context of either of these positions .
Each represents a different approach to dealing with past human events of a
particular nature . In the Idealist approach emphasis is placed on developing
an understanding of an event by discovering "the thought in the mind of the
person by whose agency the event came about" (Collingwood, 1946, p . 214)
through a process of reenactment . Within the scholarly framework of this
position, the thoughts of prominent intellectuals, such as Voltaire and
Rousseau, as they are recorded in the documents salvaged by historians,
could be used to develop an understanding of how their ideas and ideals
fueled the expression of grievances by the members of the Third Estate .
In the Positivist approach emphasis is on the use of generalizations and
laws borrowed from the social sciences in attempts to explain such events .
The major speakers for the Positivist position tend to agree that a wholesale
assimilation of historical explanation to scientific explanation is not war-
ranted . Patrick Gardiner (1952), a major spokesman for this view, referred
to the use of generalizations of a loose or porous character to provide indi-
cations . . . of the sorts of factors which, under certain circumstances, we
expect to find correlated with other sorts of factors (1952, p . 93). In the con-
text of this position emphasis could be placed on how the events that
brought the end of the Old Regime were fueled by the political, economic,
and social inequalities inflicted on members of the Third Estate .
The overthrow of the Old Regime in France in 1789 is just one of many
events of Modern European history which illustrate man's inhumanity to
man. Conversely, there are many events of modern European history that
illustrate humanity . Therefore, in the context of history questions pertain-
ing to functioning humanely could be captured in this statement of aim : to
describe how man's humanity or inhumanity to his fellow man is reflected in
the major events of modern European history.
By modifying statements of aims that have been advanced as criteria for
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selecting the content of the social studies in order to make them consistent
with and attainable through history and selected social sciences we were able
to mediate between the demands made on the social studies in the name of
citizenship education and the scholarly orientations of the disciplines
through which these demands are to be achieved . By eliminating the
socializing dimensions of these statements of aims that are inconsistent with
the scholarly orientation of the social science disciplines and by reformulat-
ing the substance of their intellectual dimensions to reflect the distinctive
character of selected social sciences, I have created statements of aims that
provide a focus for the content of the social studies . In this approach to
modification the content of the social studies takes on an instrumental
character. It accommodates external demands on the social science disci-
plines without violating their scholarly integrity .
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Abstract
A survey of 139 secondary social studies teachers and 96 secondary school super-
vising principals was conducted to determine their perceptions of the instructional
problems of teachers. Teachers and principals judged the difficulty levels experi-
enced by teachers for 10 selected instructional problem areas, using a Likert-type
scale. Medians and ranks were calculated for each problem area. The Mann- Whitney
U nonparametric procedure was employed to determine the significance of the dif-
ference in perception of difficulty between the two groups for each instructional
problem area. The instructional problem areas identified as causing the most con-
cern involved areas of professional rather than subject matter competencies .
Recent studies and reports have focused attention on teacher quality as a
factor in improving public schools in America . This examination often in-
cludes scrutiny of teacher education since colleges and universities have
responsibility for preparing teachers for the nation's schools . Various pro-
posals have emerged, including recommendations to strengthen the prep-
aration of teachers in the subject they teach and to increase academic re-
quirements for entry into teacher education programs . A related theme
emphasized by some reports is the reduction of professional education
requirements in teacher education programs. Some reform efforts have sug-
gested the elimination of professional education preparation at the
undergraduate level (Cooperman & Klogholz, 1985) .
One of the most frequent reform themes for secondary level teacher edu-
cation has been to increase requirements for the academic majors selected
by students. The Carnegie Commission Report may be viewed as an exam-
ple of this kind of recommendation . The report describes inadequate pro-
grams in teacher education and recommends revision of professional prep-
aration and strengthening the academic major of the teacher candidate
(Boyer, 1983). Lack of preparation in the teaching field and overprepara-
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tion in professional education seem to be primary concerns of the current
body of teacher education reformers . Both of these positions are worthy of
further investigation .
While knowledge of subject matter is considered an important character-
istic of social studies teachers, other competencies are also important . For
example, a position statement of the National Council for the Social Studies
identifies a number of competencies for social studies teachers (Standards,
1984). Classroom management and discipline, teachingmethods, evaluating
skills, questioning and discussion skills, as well as knowledge of subject
matter are included as major categories in the paper . These same areas ap-
pear in other studies as well .
Berryman and Schneider (1984) gathered information from a national
sample of social studies supervisors on the effectiveness of beginning social
studies teachers as a means of evaluating teacher preparation programs .
Their study revealed that supervisors consistently identified a cluster of
competencies they regarded as serious deficiencies in beginning teachers .
The deficient competencies were selecting objectives, test construction,
communication skills, questioning and discussion leadership, and teaching
strategies . All of these areas are normally included in the professional edu-
cation component of the beginning teacher's collegiate curriculum .
Opinions of experienced social studies teachers who supervise interns
were sampled by McMann and McMann (1984) for insights into the com-
petencies needed by beginning teachers . They found that the supervising
teachers rated knowledge of subject matter and teaching procedures as
equally important in teacher preparation . These two areas were viewed as
" . . . interdependent abilities rather than two distinct abilities . That is, one
does not exist without the other" (McMann & McMann, p. 39). They also
found interpersonal relations, maintaining classroom order and responsible
work habits as important teacher characteristics . These are topics one
would expect to find in a teacher education curriculum .
One data source often overlooked in compiling reform recommendations
is classroom social studies teachers themselves . Do their perceptions of
problems faced in today's high school classroom agree with the authors of
the numerous works on reforming American education? Do they agree that
increasing subject matter competence is a major factor in improving their
practice? What are the problems they identify as crucial in their social
studies classes?
Purpose
This study examined the instructional problems and concerns of social
studies teachers and their principals as a basis for improving preservice and
inservice teacher education programs . Identification of these teachers' and
principals' concerns should be of vital interest to teacher educators as well
as local school leaders with responsibility for inservice education .
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Teachers and their supervising principals were surveyed to determine :
1 . The instructional problems reported by secondary social studies
teachers .
2. The instructional problems of secondary social studies teachers re-
ported by their supervising principals .
3 . The differences in perceptions of instructional problems between the
groups .
Subjects
Subjects in this study included secondary social studies teachers (grades
9-12) and their supervising principals (principals, assistant principals and
curriculum supervisors) from an urban school system in the southeastern
United States. A survey was administered to 138 of the 151 social studies
teachers in the system and to 96 of 101 of their supervising principals . The
sample represented 91% of the population of teachers and 95% of prin-
cipals .
Procedure
An extensive review of the literature was conducted to identify the most
common instructional problems of classroom teachers (Adams, 1982 ;
Adams & Murtray, 1980; Bartholomew, 1974, 1976 ; Cruickshank, 1974) .
These problem areas were arranged randomly on a survey instrument and
administered to secondary social studies teachers and their principals during
the spring of 1985 . The survey instrument included the following randomly
ordered items :
1 . Discipline, classroom control .
2. Selecting and using appropriate teaching methods .
3 . Selecting appropriate subject matter .
4. Motivation, getting students interested .
5 . Interaction, communication with students .
6. Testing, grading, and promotion of students .
7. Knowledge of subject matter to be taught .
8. Organizing and managing the classroom .
9. Development and use of instructional materials .
10. Providing for individual differences among students .
Teachers were asked to rate the level of difficulty they experience for each
instructional problem area, using a Likert-type scale with 1 as No Difficulty
and 5 as Great Difficulty. Supervising principals were asked to rate the dif-
ficulty of the instructional problem areas for each teacher under their super-
vision, using the same scale . At the time of this study, the principals were re-
quired by school district policy to complete a minimum of four evaluations
of classroom instruction annually for each teacher under their supervision .
The response of the groups were tabulated and organized for analysis .
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Analysis, Results, and Discussion
The data in Table 1 present the rankings of instructional problems re-
ported by 138 secondary social studies teachers and 96 supervising prin-
cipals. The ranks were determined by calculating the median of the
responses of each group to each instructional problem area .
The data indicate that teachers and principals viewed the instructional
problems of teachers in much the same way for four of the top five instruc-
tional problem areas . Ranking was in one-to-one correspondence for the
Table 1
Medians, Ranks and P Values of How Secondary Social Studies
Teachers and Their Principals Perceive Teaching Problems
*Significant at the .05 level
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Top Five
(4) Motivation, getting
students interested
2.323 1 2.540 1 5728.0 .06
(10) Providing for indi-
vidual differences
among students
2.035 2 2.367 2 5206.0 .01*
(1) Discipline, classroom
control
1 .486 3 2.011 5 4597 .5 .01
(6) Testing, grading and
promotion of students
1 .432 4 2.014 4 4739 .5 .01
(2) Selecting and using
Bottom Five
1 .396 5 1.755 8 5319 .0 .01
(9) Development and use of
instructional materials
1 .362 6 1 .837 6 4841 .0 .01
(5) Interaction, communi-
cation with students
1 .312 7 1 .827 7 4618 .5 .01
(8) Organizing and managing
the classroom
1 .226 8 2.065 3 2642 .0 .01
(3) Selecting appropriate
subject matter
1 .102 9 1 .206 10 5733 .0 .03*
(7) Knowledge of subject 1 .043 10 1 .238 9 5014 .5 .01
Supervising
Teachers Principals Mann
N = 138 N = 96 Whitney
Problem Area Md. Rank Md. Rank U P Value
top two problem areas. The groups perceived Motivation, Getting Students
Interested as the number one problem of teachers . Providing For Individual
Differences Among Students was ranked second . The greatest disparity in
perception concerned Selecting and Using Appropriate Teaching Methods .
Teachers ranked this problem area fifth, while principals ranked it eighth .
Teachers and principals also agreed concerning the bottom five instruc-
tional problem areas. Both groups reported Selecting Appropriate Subject
Matter and Knowledge of Subject Matter to be Taught as areas of least con-
cern. The greatest difference in perception involved Organizing and Manag-
ing the Classroom . Teachers ranked this problem area eighth while prin-
cipals ranked it fourth .
Jn addition to rankings, the significance of the differences in perception
of difficulty between the two groups was tested for each instructional prob-
lem area . The Likert scale used in the study generated ordinal data . For that
reason, the Mann-Whitney U test, one of the most powerful nonparametric
procedures, was used for the tests of significance . An Alpha level of .05 was
selected for the test of the null hypotheses .
Teachers and their supervising principals differed significantly in their
perception of the level of difficulty for nine of the instructional problem
areas . In each case, principals viewed teachers as having more difficulty
than teachers reported for themselves . The greatest difference in perception
of difficulty for the top five problem areas involved Testing, Grading and
Promotion of Students . Among the bottom five problems, the greatest dif-
ference involved Organizing and Managing the Classroom .
Conclusions
Secondary social studies teachers participating in this study were not per-
ceived as having undue difficulty with the instructional problem areas sur-
veyed. The instructional problems identified as causing the most concern,
however, involved areas of professional knowledge and skill . Motivation,
Getting Students Interested and Providing for Individual Differences
Among Students were ranked as the top two concerns by the teachers and
principals . Discipline, Classroom Control was ranked third by teachers ;
principals ranked the area fifth .
Secondary social studies teachers and principals perceived knowledge and
selection of subject matter to be the areas of least difficulty for teachers .
The difficulty levels reported for these instructional problem areas ap-
proached the No Difficulty level on the five-point Likert-type scale used in
the study . In the judgment of the teachers and principals, knowledge and
selection of subject matter are not weaknesses of teachers .
Findings from this study are similar to those from the studies previously
cited. Teachers tend to identify areas such as motivation, classroom
management, discipline and teaching methods as more important problems
than knowledge of subject matter . Supervisors of teachers agree with these
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findings in their assessments . Both groups apparently believe that secondary
social studies teachers are sufficiently well prepared in their subject area to
teach successfully at the secondary school level .
The major problems perceived by teachers in secondary classrooms are
problems associated with content from professional courses in the teacher
education curriculum . Given that secondary social studies teachers perceive
themselves as having fewer problems related to subject matter than to pro-
fessional skills, recommendations to strengthen subject matter competen-
cies to the neglect of professional skills should be viewed with caution . This
conclusion seems consistent with results reported in the research literature
over the past forty years that call for balance between subject matter con-
tent and professional studies in the education of teachers . The disparity be-
tween what is found from research on perceived strengths and weaknesses
of teachers and what is proposed through the current educational reform
movement suggests that additional study aimed at resolving these dif-
ferences be undertaken before revising existing teacher education programs .
Perhaps joint studies involving critics and classroom teachers might yield
useful insights into this timely and perplexing problem .
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Abstract
A preliminary inquiry was conducted into social studies educators' background,
career patterns, social-political perspectives, educational views, and professional
aims and accomplishments. Subjects were limited to social studies educators in In-
diana. These white and mostly Christian, midwestern origin, Anglo-Saxon, up-
wardly mobile males with a doctoral degree from a major university had relatively
little coursework in social sciences but widely varied areas of concentration in
graduate study . Nearly half ranked quantitative aspects as the least desirable parts of
graduate study. They appeared to be democratic, humane, nonmaterialistic, and
rather critical of social studies teachers, students, and textbooks, but nevertheless en-
culturated into patterns of existing society . It is difficult to see how those who are
uncomfortable with social sciences and their inquiry methods and who seem to be
comfortably bound up in the social structure can produce teachers critically aware
enough of cultural inconsistencies to produce students who think critically .
Social studies educators have inquired systematically into a wide variety
of topics that pertain to their field . For example, considerable attention has
been given to public school teachers, teaching strategies, the underlying
social philosophy of young people, and the transmission of culturally im-
portant values . However, social studies educators seldom have asked ques-
tions about themselves . During the last ten years no article on the social
characteristics, values or perspectives of social studies educators has ap-
peared in the research journals of the profession, i.e., Theory and Research
in Social Education, Social Studies and Journal of Social Studies Research .
A search of standard references on doctoral dissertations produced during
the decade found none on the characteristics of social studies educators .
The following reports the results of a preliminary inquiry into social
studies educators' background characteristics, career patterns, social-
political perspectives, views about social studies curriculum materials and
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beliefs about their professional aims and accomplishments . The data were
collected as a first step toward identifying social and social psychological
qualities that are widely shared by members of the profession . They also
were gathered to suggest characteristics which influence the promotion of a
distinctive social orientation which might be transmitted in the social
studies .
Subjects
Respondents were drawn from a list of professors who teach social
studies methods courses in Indiana. The list was provided by the Indiana
Council for the Social Studies and was prepared from their College and
University Assembly membership roster . Each of the 40 persons on the list
was sent a questionnaire entitled A Study of the Beliefs of Social Studies
Educators, and each was requested to participate in the study . The 25 who
returned their completed questionnaires are the subjects of this study .
The small sample size restricts our ability to generalize from our findings .
It also limits the utility of quantitative presentations beyond the specifica-
tion of mean scores and percentages . Therefore, our conclusions are im-
pressionistic. Nevertheless, the data reveal patterns that suggest interesting
hypotheses.
Instrument
A questionnaire was constructed to gather data suggesting answers to
nine interrelated questions about social studies educators .
1 . Do they share certain background characteristics? Eight items identi-
fied characteristics such as gender, race, ethnicity and religion .
2. Do they have in common certain early socialization experiences? Six
items dealt with parents' education and occupation .
3. Do they have similar educational backgrounds? Twelve items asked
about undergraduate and graduate institutions attended, majors and
concentrations . Respondents also were asked to evaluate their college
and university experiences .
4. Do they have similar career histories? Respondents were asked to list,
in chronological order, all of the positions - omitting temporary jobs
such as summer employment- which they have held from the receipt
of their undergraduate degree to the present .
5 . Do they have approximately similar value orientations? The question-
naire contained two independent measures of general social values :
Rokeach (1968), 12 items ; Inglehart (1979), 4 items .
6. Do they share a more-or-less distinctive view of the American political
system? The widely used Campbell, Gurin and Miller (1954) measure
was employed to indicate sense of citizen obligation . Their perception
of the distribution of power in America was elicited by their choice be-
tween two contrasting depictions of the structure of power at the na-
tional level . One conveyed the pluralist image emphasizing that, while
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it is true that not all groups have equal power, power in the United
States is as equally distributed as possible in the context of an ad-
vanced industrial nation (Rose, 1967) . The alternative paragraph em-
phasized that almost all important political decisions are made by a
few individuals, such as corporate leaders and government advisors,
who are not elected by the public (Domhoff, 1967) .
7 . Do they have a common perception of the curriculum materials with
which they work? Five items developed by Barr, Shermis and Barth
(1978) were used to assess respondents attitudes toward social studies
textbooks .
8 . Do they share a common perspective on the goals of the social studies?
The 15 item scale developed by Shermis and Barth (1985) was em-
ployed.
9. Do they tend to share common opinions about the accomplishments
of programs of social studies education? Two open-ended questions
were used : (1) In your judgment, what do you think of the products we
turn out, that is, teachers of social studies? (2) What is your judgment
of the products of social studies teachers, that is, students in elemen-
tary, middle, junior and senior high schools?
Findings
Background characteristics
All 25 respondents were white males in the age range 33-65 with a mean
age of 49 .7 years. Eight (32%) specified an ethnic background . Eight dif-
ferent Christian denominations were identified as the religion of choice,
with no denomination overrepresented . Only 5 (20%) had lived at age 16 in
an urban center of over 100,000 population. Most of their parents (19
fathers and 22 mothers) did not graduate from college ; only 8 fathers (32%)
and 3 mothers (12%) were employed in professional, technical, managerial
or administrative occupations .
The respondents were educated primarily in the midwest as
undergraduates (84%) and in graduate school (80%) . Eight (32%) received
undergraduate degrees from a major university, public or private, while 20
(80%) received graduate degrees from a major university . Nine (36%)
graduated from a smaller private college ; only 1 (4%) completed graduate
study in a college of this type . A doctoral degree was held by 20 (80%), 13
with a Ph .D. and 7 with an Ed.D. The remaining 5 (20%) held a graduate
degree below doctoral level . A majority (19 ; 76%) had taught in public, pri-
vate or military schools prior to college or university teaching . For most,
college teaching represented upward mobility as compared with parents and
with respondents' earlier careers .
Educational experiences
The open-ended question concerning what respondents liked most about
their undergraduate education produced a clear pattern . The three qualities
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most liked were small classes and the opportunity to interact with faculty,
exposure to new ideas, including interaction with students from different
backgrounds, and liberal arts courses . The open-ended question about what
respondents liked least in their undergraduate programs did not elicit any
distinctive patterns . Complaints included items such as irrelevant courses
and large, impersonal classes - features of undergraduate education likely
to be listed as undesirable by most college graduates .
Each subject listed three areas of concentration in the graduate program
completed . The 75 responses produced a highly varied list, ranging from
journalism to art, philosophy, English, business administration and elemen-
tary education . No specific area was statistically overrepresented . However,
what was noteworthy was the infrequency with which the social sciences
(12%)-here understood to include anthropology, economics, political
science, psychology and sociology- appeared on the list .
When asked what they liked most about their graduate programs, re-
spondents were consistent with 19 (76%) spontaneously mentioning intel-
lectual stimulation, new ideas, probing ideas deeply and the like . While they
were free to list as many qualities as they wished and to be as general or
specific in their statements of choice as they wanted, features other than the
intellectual challenge of graduate education, such as specific courses or the
acquisition of certain skills, were mentioned only six times .
There was also a clear pattern of response to the open-ended question
about their judgment of the least desirable components of their graduate
education . Almost half, 11 (44%) specified courses involving the manipula-
tion of quantitative data ; e .g ., tests and measurement, econometrics, finance,
and statistics . The remaining responses included the usual litany of graduate
student complaints-too many required courses, impersonality of some
classes and exploitation of graduate students by university administration
and faculty .
Social and Political Orientations
As a point of departure we used two independent measures for determin-
ing their general social values (Rokeach, 1968 ; Inglehart, 1979). In the
Rokeach measure subjects are presented with a list of twelve values in al-
phabetical order which "many people say are important to them ." Re-
spondents are asked to indicate the relative importance of each of the values
to themselves personally by rank ordering 1, 2, 3, etc. as most important,
next most important, etc. Scores for each value were averaged, with lower
scores representing higher value priority . In order of the importance as-
signed by the social science educators in our study, the values were : (1) a
meaningful life (2 .79), (2) a world at peace (4.21), (3) freedom (4.62),
(4) friendship (4.75), (5) respect for others (5 .09), (6) wisdom (5.43), (7)
equality (6.21), (8) respect from others (6.96), (9) maturity (7 .29), (10) sal-
vation (7 .86), (11) comfort (8 .61), and (12) security (9.22) .
The Inglehart measure asked: "If you had a choice among the following
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four things, which are the two that seem most desirable to you : (1) main-
taining order in the nation ; (2) giving people more say in political decisions ;
(3) fighting rising prices ; (4) protecting freedom of speech?" According to
Inglehart, the order and prices responses indicate acquisition values while
more say and freedom of speech responses are chosen by those with a post-
bourgeois perspective. Responses to this item expressed a nearly unani-
mous pattern. There were only four selections of order and only one selec-
tion of prices responses .
Taken together, the independent measures of values unambiguously sug-
gest that our subjects place remarkably little emphasis on the materialistic
values often said to dominate American culture . Rather, they seem far more
concerned with the meaning they derive from their work, their social re-
lationships in the context of a peaceful and democratic society, and a sense
of citizen obligation . Finally, 80% endorsed the pluralist idea that power in
America is as equally distributed as possible in the context of an advanced
industrial nation rather than the elitist position that important political de-
cisions in America are made by a few individuals while citizens' groups
generally have little effect on the outcome of political issues .
Views of the Social Studies
Respondents were asked an open-ended question about the primary role
of the social studies . While this question elicited a fairly wide range of
answers, four occurred with greater frequency than the rest . In order of fre-
quency mentioned these answers were : (1) to prepare students to participate
responsibly and competently as citizens of a democratic society ; (2) to pro-
vide students with insights into problems facing American society and the
world; (3) to help students become independent, free-thinking adults ; and
(4) to transmit our cultural heritage, identifying our progress and our prob-
lems .
What role do social studies educators believe the social sciences should
have in the social studies education curriculum? Only 6 in our sample (24%)
agreed that the proper source of curriculum for the social studies is those
problems identified by the social sciences . Again, only 10 (40%) agreed that
students should develop a faith in the objective procedures of the social
sciences. Nevertheless, the majority, 14 (56%), felt that students should ac-
quire rigorous analytic skills and these come from mastery of the knowledge
gathering techniques of the social sciences. There was greater agreement on
the part of 16 (64%) that it is important for students to learn the concepts
and methods of the various social science disciplines . We shall discuss this
rather ambivalent orientation toward the social sciences in a later section of
this paper .
An open-ended question asked the social studies educators to judge the
products they turn out, that is, teachers of social studies . Here answers were
not so diverse . While being careful to note that there is considerable in-
dividual variation, the consensus view was clearly that students tend to be
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mediocre, somewhat deficient, and rather ordinary . However, students
were not seen as completely ineffective. Several respondents remarked that
while their knowledge of content is often terribly limited, their caring is fre-
quently great . Another commented that "(They) do quite well, considering
their salaries and lack of support for provocative, analytic programs."
Given this unenthusiastic view of their own students and former students,
it is not surprising that social studies educators also express some dis-
pleasure when asked about the products of social studies teachers, that is,
students in elementary, middle, junior and senior high schools. Many re-
spondents prefaced their remarks about the social studies education of
school children with two observations . First, there is an enormous range of
variation among the students . Second, today's school children are probably
better than previous generations but are capable of doing much more than
they are required .
The educators' specific concerns about the students, in order of frequency
mentioned, included their lack of self-reliance, lack of critical skills, and
failure to see the relevance of social studies for their own lives . In regard to
this last point, several of our respondents commented that most school
children today see the social studies as little more than memorization of
specific facts.
Respondents' disappointment in school students' apparent lack of appre-
ciation of the social studies was not seen as solely, or even primarily, the
result of inadequate role performance of social studies classroom teachers .
One of the teachers' major resources, the social studies text, was seen as a
major culprit. Our sample of social studies educators tended to disagree
with all of five positive statements about social studies textbooks . Social
studies textbooks are fair and objective in their treatment (8 ; 32%) ; Social
studies textbooks are scholarly and accurate (4 ; 16%); Social studies text-
books are up-to-date (7; 28%); Social studies textbooks promote critical
thought and awareness of problems (5 ; 20%); and Social studies textbooks
reflect the realities of a multicultural and pluralistic society (4 ; 16%) all
received mostly negative responses .
Interpretations
Our findings may or may not be representative . Among other conditions
influencing them may be a two tier structure among social studies educa-
tors, both nationwide and in our own sample . It may be that one tier comes
from solid academic backgrounds, earned Ph .D.s from large state univer-
sities and participates professionally at high levels . Another tier may have
graduated from small, academically weak institutions, does not hold a doc-
torate, is assigned a heavy teaching load with wide variety of courses, and
does little in the way of research or publishing . What characterizes one tier
may be inaccurate for the other . In any event, our data should be inter-
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preted cautiously . They can nevertheless provide some basis for a few
disturbing questions and one conclusion . First, what is the conclusion?
The rather clear-cut value patterns in our data indicate that social studies
educators in our sample are nonmaterialistic, somewhat liberal, humane,
democratic, egalitarian, altruistic and committed to the values of cultural
pluralism . Even a cursory glance at the last 75 years or so of the history of
the social studies movement reveals a set of values which seem to be con-
gruent with what we see among our sample of educators . One can find in
this century constant exhortation for social studies teachers to commit
themselves to improving citizenship, which in our society implies an orien-
tation having to do with democratic values and critical thought, with critical
thinking usually taken to be the application of the scientific method .
If enhancing critical thought and improving democratic citizenship and
participation are, in fact, the normative values in the field, it is to be ex-
pected that most of those who are attracted to the field would share them . It
is, then, no surprise that the individual value hierarchies found here are con-
gruent with that of the institutionalized hierarchy found in the field .
The clear tendency of our sample to be white, male, Christian, Anglo-
Saxon, middleaged, middlewestern and upwardly mobile in both intergen-
erational and career terms, raises at least two related questions . Are such
individuals likely to be thoroughly enculturated into the patterns of their
society? And if they are, how likely is it that they will be fully capable of
enabling their students to be critical of the unresolved cultural conflicts
within our society?
To be critical within the context of social studies can refer to many
phenomena. It may relate to being skeptical as opposed to gullible, to iden-
tifying inconsistent, unproven or false premises, to questioning facts or to
challenging discrepant information . From the Hunt/Metcalf (1968) point of
view in the reflective inquiry position, it signifies questioning the structure
of existing social institutions and dominant cultural beliefs and values of
one's own society. Hunt and Metcalf point out that most social studies
teaching leaves students incapable of perceiving the problems or incon-
sistencies of either institutions or cultural beliefs . An updated list of in-
consistent cultural premises, patterned after their 1968 edition of Teaching
High School Social Studies perhaps would include the following :
Women are the intellectual and moral equivalent of men-but they
should be happy with the traditional family and sex roles .
This is a land of unlimited opportunity where anyone can get as far as
he or she wishes-but not in my neighborhood .
Our natural resources are precious and fragile things which must be
preserved and protected -but oil and mineral resources are necessary to
create jobs and make us energy independent .
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Life from the moment of conception is sacred-but those who com-
mit atrocious crimes should be executed .
It is important to give business the freedom needed to pursue indi-
vidual objectives-but we have seen how business, and especially large
corporations, are given to creating unsafe workplaces, dumping toxic
chemicals hither and yon producing products that don't work and in ad-
dition may be dangerous .
Historically, social studies teachers have tended not to raise such issues
with their students . Woodward (1985) quotes statistics to indicate that as
much as 90% of classroom time is structured by instructional materials,
especially textbooks . Shaver, Helburn and Davis (1979) also conclude that
the most typical teaching arrangement continues to be one teacher in a room
with 30 children using a single textbook. Since the time that Beal (1936)
wrote about academic freedom-or more precisely the lack of it-critics
have regularly discovered that teachers tend to keep one eye cocked to the
community and regularly engage in self- or student-censorship in order to
avoid dealing with matters which may be considered too controversial . The
combination of teacher timidity and almost compulsive systematic coverage
of the textbook has guaranteed that in the vast majority of social studies
classrooms, live, meaningful and important social problems will not be con-
sidered .
Perhaps one reason for textbook dominance is that teachers, social
studies educators, have avoided confronting these very issues as well . There
is a cogent reason why social studies educators are unlikely to do so . Long
ago, Mannheim (1936) observed that human thought is situationally rela-
tive . People are least likely to question those institutional structures within
which they live and which serve their shared interests .
Our data suggest that social studies educators, for the most part, have
benefitted from the social structure of our society . The data show that our
sample has tended to be upwardly mobile, both in career and intergenera-
tional terms . The responses suggest to us that many social studies educators
take the position that our society, with all of its flaws and shortcomings,
may be better than any other, that over the years and especially in this cen-
tury, it has proven itself sensitive to inequities (e .g ., poverty, powerlessness,
class discrimination, and racial, religious and ethnic bigotry) and -is gradu-
ally improving . With continuing effort, we should in the future come even
closer to our goals . Such an ideology clearly underlies citizenship trans-
mission. It would appear to be the frame of reference of many social studies
teachers (Barr, Barth & Shermis, 1978 ; Shermis & Barth, 1985) . It well may
be equally the position of many social studies educators .
We must raise a question about the antipathy of our respondents toward
quantitative courses. This may be related to their lukewarm attitudes
toward social science courses . Our respondents did not enroll, either in their
undergraduate or graduate careers, in many social science courses. More-
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over, social sciences have increasingly moved toward quantitative measure-
ment. Those who tend to feel uncomfortable with such an orientation can
also be expected to find themselves increasingly handicapped in understand-
ing analysis and interpretation of social science data . This raises a problem .
Inherent in the social science enterprise is a concern for critical thought at
two levels . First, the epistemology within any social science demands critical
awareness of all aspects of the knowledge-gathering process . To be inducted
into any science requires one to ask interminable questions about the mean-
ing, extent and limitation of any given knowledge claim . Second, inherent
in the social sciences is a pervasive disinclination to accept traditional be-
liefs, popular explanations and culturally sanctioned perceptions . Aware-
ness of how institutions develop and how the social structure functions or-
dinarily makes individuals less rather than more prone to accept the
conventional wisdom .
It is difficult to see how those teachers of the social studies who are un-
comfortable with social science and its inquiry methods or who have rather
limited understanding of the concepts, data and conclusions of social
science can enable their students to develop much critical awareness of the
problems and inconsistencies of American culture. While the data of the
social studies clearly derives from more than the social sciences, (Barr,
Barth, & Shermis, 1978) the ineluctable fact is that a rich repository of data
and generalizations about our society and those of others has come from the
social sciences . It would seem that not to possess some part of the store-
house of such knowledge is to be as uncritical and accepting as the general
populace. And if such is the case, it is difficult to see how students of those
who are short on social science knowledge will develop the allegedly de-
sirable critical perspective .
If this analysis is correct, it would explain, in part, the widely noted lack
of change among social studies teachers . It might explain why, despite 75
years of research into social problems and book after book on critical
thought, there is so little of either in the social studies . Before one can en-
gage in critical thought one must, as Dewey (1933, 1938) said, wrest the
problem from the ground of existence . If one is predisposed not to perceive
the problem, whether because of unfamiliarity with social science methods
and content or because one is inextricably bound up in the social structure,
it is unlikely that one's students or the students of one's students will be able
to do .
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characteristics as independent, explanatory variables predicting general
achievement .
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